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Hedge Fund Regulation via Basel
III
Wulf A. Kaal*

ABSTRACT

This Article is a rejoinder to a recent comment by Professor
Romano on an earlier paper I coauthored with Christian
Kirchner. Professor Romano suggests regulatory arbitrage,
rather than the targeted regulation of bank lending to hedge
funds under Basel II, as a hedge against systemic failure. I
contend that it was not harmonization through Basel II but
rather the profitability of certain assets and business strategies
that caused banks to hold similar assets and engage in similar
strategies. In particular,I find that the increasingrole of hedge
funds in the credit derivatives market, in combination with the
market's recent failure, suggests that an increased emphasis on
banks' lending exposure to hedge funds could be justified.
Using the methodological approach of New Institutional
Economics, I evaluate recent regulatory changes, including the
U.S. Dodd-FrankAct, the AIFM Directive, and other pertinent
regulation. I provide an impact analysis of regulatory changes,
de lege lata and de lege ferenda, with a special emphasis on,
and historical analysis of, hedge fund registration rules and
asymmetric regulationin Dodd-Frankand the AIFM Directive.
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Finance, Durham University. The author would like to thank Christian Kirchner, John
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St. Gallen, Switzerland. I would also like to thank Joan MacLeod Heminway and
Lyman P. Q. Johnson for comments and David L. Mengle for helpful tips on data
sources. Special thanks go to Roberta Romano for her response and comment on the
paper coauthored with Christian Kirchner, "Economics of Financial Market Regulation:
Banking Regulation, Corporate Governance, Financial Reporting Standards and Hedge
Funds," presented on June 4, 2010 at the Third International Conference on Law and
Economics at the University of St. Gallen (on file with author). This rejoinder hopes to
address some of the issues. The author would also like to thank Ms. Caroline Kunz
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research grant from Mississippi College School of Law.

389

VANDERBILTIOURNAL

390

OF TRANSNATIONAL LAW

[VOL. 44:389

TABLE OF CONTENTS

I.
II.

III.

INTRODUCTION

1.

2.

3.
IV.

.......

391

..........

2.
3.
4.

.............

401

a) A Controversial Drafting Process ........... 401
406
.......................
b) The Final Version
........
408
c) Impact Assessment ..............
410
...........
Dodd-FrankHedge Fund Rules ...
a) History of Hedge Fund Registration in
412
.............
the United States...........
416
b) Dodd-Frank Hedge Fund Rules ............
.........
418
(1) Disclosure Requirements .....
418
(2) Hedge Fund Registration Exemptions.
(3) De Minimis Hedge Fund Investment
..........................421
Exemption
(4) Revision of Accredited Investor
422
...........................
Standards
c) Impact Assessment of Hedge Fund
................. 424
Rules Under Dodd-Frank
426
(1) Increased Disclosure Obligations.........
427
...........
Authority
(2) SEC's Rulemaking
429
.......................
(3) Blue Sky Laws
................... 431
(4) Cost of Compliance
433
(5) De Minimis Investment Exemption .....
d) Revision of Accredited Investor
434
..............................
Standards

Impact Assessment of Asymmetric
Regulation in Dodd-Frankand the AIFM
Directive...............................
.......................................

The Evolution of the Basel Accords
............
The Basel Approach Revised .................
..........
The Core Rules in Basel III.........

AN ALTERNATIVE APPROACH TO HEDGE FUND
...............................
REGULATION

1.

VII.

The AIFM Directive

BASEL III

1.
2.
3.
V.

...........................

METHODOLOGY
......................................
398
HEDGE FUND REGULATION IN THE AFTERMATH
OF THE FINANCIAL CRISIS......
....................
400

........

Moral Hazardand Its Impact on Indirect
Regulation of Hedge Funds via Counterparty
......
Credit Risk Management (CCRM)......
Systemic Risk and Externalities....
..........
Market Failurein FinancialInstruments.........
Hedge Fund Regulation via Basel III................

CONCLUSION

436
439

440
442
444
448

451
451
452
456

463
........................................

2011]

HEDGE FUND REGULATION VIA BASEL III

391

I. INTRODUCTION

The collapse in the market for exotic financial instruments, the
liquidity crisis in major financial institutions, and the government
bailouts of 2008-2009 have undermined confidence in the financial
markets and illustrated shortcomings in corporate governance and
banking regulation.' Hedge funds have been blamed for their part in
the crisiS2 and have become a scapegoat for the problems affecting
Regulators worldwide
many aspects of financial markets.3
increasingly scrutinize hedge funds and have introduced, among
other measures, registration requirements, limits on leverage, and
more disclosure. 4
Much of the new regulation in the Dodd-Frank Act has been
criticized for being reactive and shortsighted.5 Similar criticisms of

For a general analysis of causal factors of the international financial
1.
markets crisis, see Christian Kirchner, Wege aus der InternationalenFinanzkrise, 89
WIRTSCHAFTSDIENST 459-65 (2009).
2.
See, e.g., James Kanter, Tighter Rules for Foreign Hedge Funds Advance in
Europe, N.Y. TIMES, May 17, 2010, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/05/18/business/globall
18hedge.html?r=1 ("Regulators and lawmakers worldwide are tightening their scrutiny
of hedge funds and private equity firms on the grounds that they have been partly to
blame for the worst financial crisis in a generation.").
3.
See Kate Burgess, Suspect Strategies: Activism in the Hedge Fund Sector,
FIN. TIMES, June 22, 2010, http://www.ft.com/cms/s/2/40826fee-7dda-lldf-b35700144feabdcO.html#axzzlBtNc8avl (describing the German-European Union debate
after the TCI's attempt to take over Deutsche B6rse); see also Markus Lahrkamp,
Germany: Day of the Locusts?, HEDGE FUND J., Mar. 2007, http://www.thehedgefund
(describing
journal.comlmagazine/200703/commentary/germany-day-of-the-locusts.php
the "Locusts" debate); America's Stockmarket Plunge: A Few Minutes of Mayhem,
EcONOMIST, May 13, 2010, http://www.economist.com/node/16113270 ("Another factor
[in the debate] was the sudden retreat by the 'high frequency' firms whose algorithmic
trading has come to dominate equity markets.").
For example, the Private Fund Investment Advisers Registration Act
4.
(PFLARA), incorporated in Title IV of the Dodd-Frank Act. Dodd Frank Wall Street
Reform and Consumer Protection (Dodd-Frank) Act tit. IV, Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124
Stat. 1376 (2010) (to be codified as amended in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.); see also,
e.g., Commission Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the
Council on Alternative Investment Fund Managers and Amending Directives
2004/39/EC and 2009/... IEC, at 3, COM (2009) 207 final (Apr. 30, 2009) [hereinafter
Commission AIF Proposal] (stating that hedge funds have contributed to asset price
inflation and the rapid growth of structured credit markets); European Parliament
Legislative Resolution of 11 November 2010 on the Proposal for a Directive of the
European Parliamentand of the Council on Alternative Investment Fund Managers
and Amending Directives, at 20, COM (2009) 0207 (Nov. 11, 2010) [hereinafter
November 11 Directive].
Stephen M. Bainbridge, Dodd-Frank:Quack Federal CorporateGovernance
5.
Round II, at 10 (UCLA Sch. of Law, Law-Econ. Research Paper No. 10-12, 2010),
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1673575.
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the Alternative Investment Fund Managers Directive (AIFM
Directive) are likely. Scholars have proposed a wide range of possible
solutions to address the concerns in the debate on hedge funds and
hedge fund regulation. 6 In response to an earlier paper coauthored
with Christian Kirchner, Professor Romano suggests regulatory
arbitrage, rather than the targeted regulation of bank lending to

6.
See, e.g., Ronald J. Colombo, Trust and the Reform of Securities Regulation,
35 DEL. J. CORP. L. 829, 871-72 (2010) (proposing a trust-based approach, and
explaining that those hedge funds that have not "gain[ed] traction in the development
of affective and generalized trust . . ." could register, and "avail themselves of the next
best thing: cognitive and specific trust via voluntary subjection to SEC regulation");
Evan M. Gilbert, Unnecessary Reform: The Fallacies with and Alternatives to SEC
Regulation of Hedge Funds, 2 J. BUS. ENTREPRENEURSHIP & L. 319, 343-48 (2009)
(offering alternatives to mandatory registration of hedge funds, including voluntary
registration, regulating hedge fund creditors, regulating intermediary investment
vehicles more stringently, relaxing regulations on mutual funds to create more
competition for hedge funds, and giving hedge funds proprietary rights over their
investment strategies); Paul M. Jonna, In Search of Market Discipline: The Case for
Indirect Hedge Fund Regulation, 45 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 989, 1022 (2008) (suggesting
that pension funds may only invest in hedge funds that have registered with the SEC);
Wulf A. Kaal, Hedge Fund Valuation: Retailization, Regulation, and Investor
Suitability, 28 ANN. REV. BANKING & FIN. L. 581, 635 (2009) (proposing the institution
of general investor suitability requirements); David Schneider, If at First You Don't
Succeed: Why the SEC Should Try and Try Again to Regulate Hedge Fund Advisers, 9
J. Bus. & SEC. L. 261, 307-10 (2009) (suggesting leverage limits and requiring the
hedge fund industry to adhere to the principles in either PWG's Best Practices or the
Managed Funds Association's Sound Practices guide for greater transparency); Dale B.
Thompson, Why We Need a Superfund for Hedge Funds, 79 MIss. L.J. 995, 996 (2010)
(suggesting that we borrow the concept of superfunds from environmental law, i.e.,
collect taxes from hedge funds relative to the amount of liquidity risk and use the
revenue to purchase distressed assets, thus incentivizing the reduction of liquidity);
J.W. Verret, Dr. Jones and the Raiders of Lost Capital,Hedge Fund Regulation Part II,
A Self-Regulation Proposal, 32 DEL. J. CORP. L. 799, 817-24 (2007); Carl J. Nelson,
Note, Hedge Fund Regulation: A Proposal to Maintain Hedge Funds' Effectiveness
Without SEC Regulation, 2 BROOK. J. CORP. FIN. & COM. L. 221, 221 (2007) (proposing
that investment requirements for hedge funds should be updated and that
counterparties should be subject to greater disclosure); Christian Kirchner & Wulf A.
Kaal, Economics of Financial Market Regulation: Banking Regulation, Corporate
Governance, Financial Reporting Standards and Hedge Funds 2 (June 4, 2010)
(presented at the Third International Conference on Law and Economics at the
University of St. Gallen) (on file with author); Roberta Romano, Against Financial
Regulation Harmonization:A Comment 2-3 (Yale Law & Econ., Working Paper No.
414, 2010), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract-id=1697348.
[R]egulatory arbitrage is not a source of grave concern, in the absence of data to
the contrary regarding specific products, entities or markets. Moreover, the
solution to regulatory arbitrage, regulatory harmonization, can itself generate
systemic risk to the financial system, which has only recently begun to be
appreciated in the ongoing assessment of the factors contributing to the global
financial crisis of 2007-08.
Romano, supra, at 2-3.
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hedge funds under Basel III, as a hedge against systemic failure.7
Others contend that the pre-Dodd-Frank approach of allowing
advisers to voluntarily register was more effective, and they propose a
trust-based approach that would allow funds that earned general
trust from the public to operate on the basis of that trust, without the
interference of regulation.8 The debate over the most appropriate
form of hedge fund regulation is far-ranging, and important proposals
include changing the criteria for investing in hedge funds, 9 setting up
a self-regulatory organization,' 0 subjecting counterparties to greater
disclosure," increasing leverage limits' 2 and transparency,' 3 using
the concept of superfunds and collecting taxes from hedge funds,' 4
regulating hedge fund creditors,' 5 relaxing the regulation of mutual

7.
Romano, supra note 6, at 1 (arguing that regulatory arbitrage is a
byproduct of regulatory diversity and "provides a valuable, and little appreciated,
hedge against systemic failure").
8.
Colombo, supra note 6, at 871-72 (explaining that those hedge funds that
have not "gain[ed] traction in the development of affective and generalized trust" could
take advantage of the option to register, and "avail themselves of the next best thing:
cognitive and specific trust via voluntary subjection to SEC regulation"); see also
Gilbert, supra note 6, at 344 (advocating a voluntary registration system for hedge
funds).
9.
Kaal, supra note 6, at 627-28; Nelson, supra note 6, at 231; Schneider,
supra note 6, at 308.
10.
Verret notes that because government regulators have difficulty regulating
rapidly changing markets, "[olne answer to this problem is to let the private market
regulate itself through encouragement and support from the government oversight
body." Verret, supra note 6, at 817-18, 836-37. The SEC would oversee self-regulation
in four ways: encouraging the formation of a self-regulatory organization, establishing
rules, approving the rulemaking body to ensure the representatives encompass "a
representative sample of the hedge fund industry," and establishing that there is a
separate body within the organization that has independent authority to enforce
violations of the self-regulating authority's rules. Id.
11.
Nelson contends that those who provided excessive leverage to hedge funds
should be more strictly monitored and because they are already regulated this would
be an easy transition. Nelson, supra note 6, at 238-39. He further points to reports by
the SEC and FTC that "indicated the most effective way to contain excess leverage was
not by regulating hedge funds, but through the discipline of hedge fund counterparties,
such as the banks who lend hedge funds capital with which to invest." Id.
Schneider states that one approach is to place leverage ratio limits on
12.
hedge funds. Schneider, supra note 6, at 307-08. "Leverage limits can insulate
systemic risk for two reasons. First, hedge funds will be less likely to fail or default on
their loans . . .. Second, should a hedge fund fail, creditors will feel less pain which will
stem the possible ripple effect." Id.
13.
Id. at 309-10.
14.
Thompson suggests borrowing the concept of superfunds from
environmental law to address the need for hedge fund regulation. Thompson, supra
note 6, at 996-97. This proposed method would involve collecting a tax from hedge
funds. Id. The tax payable by hedge funds would be relative to the amount of liquidity
risk of the portfolio. Id. The revenue from the taxes would be used to purchase
distressed assets when problems arise due to liquidity and valuation. Id.
15.
Gilbert contends that hedge fund creditors should be regulated instead of
hedge fund managers because by limiting the amount of credit the banks can extend to
hedge funds, a hedge fund's collapse would have less impact. Gilbert, supra note 6, at
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funds to increase competition for hedge funds,16 introducing
proprietary rights for hedge fund trading strategies,' 7 and regulating
hedge funds through their investors.' 8
Using New Institutional Economics as a methodological
approach, the analysis in this Article is based on the assumption that
regulation of hedge funds could minimize some of the social
externalities that may be generated by the hedge fund industry.
Given the global scale of hedge fund activities and the dynamic
nature of their trading strategies, however, it is unclear if and to
what extent hedge funds generate social externalities. The role of
hedge funds in the financial crisis is also unclear.' 9 After the collapse
of Long-Term Capital Management (LTCM) in 1998, most dealerbanks required full collateralization of hedge fund transactions. 20
Accordingly, hedge funds were less levered than banks. 21 Later, the
collapse of large hedge funds, like Amaranth in 2006,22 and large
redemptions by investors during and after the crisis23 did not cause

345-46. Intermediary investment vehicles would be subjected to more stringent
regulations because these regulations would also be more easily implemented. Id.
Id. at 346-47 (suggesting that relaxing regulations of mutual funds would
16.
create more competition for hedge fund business and would, in turn, incentivize more
voluntary registration of hedge funds).
17.
Id. at 347-48 (arguing that proprietary rights in hedge fund trading
strategies and other private hedge fund information would eliminate the concern that
hedge funds will not voluntarily register because they are concerned about making
such strategies public).
See Jonna, supra note 6, at 1016-17 (suggesting a requirement that
18.
pension funds only invest in hedge funds that have registered with the SEC, or limiting
the amount of plan assets that can be invested in unregistered hedge funds).
See Romano, supra note 6, at 3 ("[T]here is an absence of evidence pointing
19.
to hedge funds as a contributing factor in the recent financial panic.").
20.
Too Big to Swallow, ECONOMIST, May 16, 2009, http://www.economist.com/
node/13604641 (noting that after the failure of LTCM there was flight to traditional
banking).
21.
Professionally Gloomy, ECONOMIST, May 17, 2008, http://www.economist.com/
node/11325440 ("After the collapse of Long-Term Capital Management in 1998, banks
started scanning the counterparty horizon more carefully for risks from hedge funds.
From now on they will look much more closely at each other.").
22.
Buttonwood:
Paint It
Black,
ECONOMIST,
Oct.
20,
2007,
http://www.economist.com/node/9993586 ("[T]raders repeatedly get caught out by
'unprecedented' market movements. The collapse of two hedge funds, Long-Term
Capital Management in 1998 and Amaranth Advisors in 2006, were cases in point.");
see also The Galleon Affair: All at Sea, EcONOMIST, Oct. 24, 2009, http://www.econ
omist.com/node/14710676 (noting that the case against Raj Rajaratnam, cofounder of
Galleon, for insider trading could decrease the credibility of hedge funds).
23.
See Gregory Zuckerman & Ann Davis, Hedge Fund's Heavy Metal; Red Kite
Bet on Copper, then Good Times End, WALL ST. J., Feb. 8, 2007, at C2 ("If rival traders
believe a firm will have to sell positions to meet investor redemptions, they can sell
those investments ahead of time, increasing the pressure. Some traders made those
moves last fall when it emerged that hedge fund Amaranth Advisors LLC was having
problems.").
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systemic problems. Moreover, hedge funds have fewer assets and less
leverage than banks. This may decrease the likelihood that hedge
funds cause the next crisis. Without the threat of systemic risk and
without a clear delineation of social externalities caused by hedge
funds, the purpose of direct hedge fund regulation is unclear.
Nevertheless, recent regulatory initiatives in Europe and the
United States attempt to address many perceived shortcomings of the
current regulations and harmonize international banking regulation
more effectively than before the crisis. 24 Regulatory initiatives such
as registration requirements,2 5 a passport regime, 26 limitations on
leverage,2 7 and general disclosure requirements2 8 limit hedge funds'
ability to provide above average returns to their investors. The
Dodd-Frank Act restricts a banking entity from having an ownership
interest in or being a sponsor of a private equity or hedge fund if such
investments amount to more than 3 percent of the bank's Tier 1
capital or the bank's interest is more than 3 percent of the total
ownership of the fund.2 9 Moreover, private equity and hedge funds
with assets under management of $150 million or more will have to
register with the SEC, although venture capital funds will be exempt
from full registration.3 0 In the European Union, the EU Commission

24.
See, e.g., Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection (DoddFrank) Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010) (to be codified as amended in
scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.); November 11 Directive, supranote 4.
See Dodd-Frank Act § 410, 124 Stat. at 1576-77 (providing for federal
25.
registration of investment advisers, and registration and recording of venture capital
funds).
Draft Report on the Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament
26.
and of the Council on Alternative Investment Fund Managers and Amending Directives,
at 18, COM (2009) 2014 (Nov. 23, 2009) [hereinafter Draft Report], available at
http://www.europarl.europa.eulsides/getDoc.do?type=COMPARL&mode=XML&langua
ge=EN&reference=PE430.709.
27.
See id. at 14 ("It is considered necessary ... to impose limits on the level of
leverage that AIFM could use .... ).
28.
See id. at 21 (describing the "disclosure obligations of AIFM").
See Dodd-Frank Act § 619, 124 Stat. at 1618-31.
29.
Notwithstanding any other provision of law, investments by a banking entity in
a hedge fund or private equity fund shall ... be immaterial to the banking
entity, as defined, by rule, pursuant to subsection (b)(2), but in no case may the
aggregate of all of the interests of the banking entity in all such funds exceed 3
percent of the Tier 1 capital of the banking entity.
Id.
30.

See id. §§ 407-408, 124 Stat. at 1574-75.

The Commission shall provide an exemption from the registration
requirements under this section to any investment adviser of private funds, if
each of such investment adviser acts solely as an adviser to private funds and
has assets under management in the United States of less than
$150,000,000.... No investment adviser that acts as an investment adviser
solely to 1 or more venture capital funds shall be subject to the registration
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introduced the AIFM Directive.31 The AIFM Directive provides the
possibility of harmonized requirements for entities engaged in the
management and administration of alternative investment funds, i.e.,
European-wide regulation of hedge funds. 32 The AIFM Directive
seeks to regulate more than just the hedge fund and private equity
industries; it is an attempt to gain regulatory oversight over a large
share of the "shadow banking system" that is presently
unsupervised.3 3
At the same time, measures that are primarily intended to
ensure the well-functioning of financial markets impact hedge funds
as primary market participants.
For instance, proposed EU
legislation allows EU member state authorities, subject to
coordination by the European Securities and Markets Authority
(ESMA), to restrict or ban credit default swaps.3 4 Similarly, the U.S.
Dodd-Frank Act grants federal agencies broad regulatory authority
over the trading of derivative securities and other financial

requirements of this title with respect to the provision of investment advice
relating to a venture capital fund.
Id.
31.
32.

November 11 Directive, supra note 4, at 30.
Id. at 10.

33.
See 10 HAROLD S. BLOOMENTHAL & SAMUEL WOLFF, INTERNATIONAL
CAPITAL MARKETS AND SECURITIES REGULATION § 1:160 (2010) (noting that the AIFM

Directive would subject depositories, which must be banks, to requirements that would
result in greater transparency).
34.
See Press Release, Europa, Public Consultation on Short Selling and Credit
Default Swaps-Frequently Asked Questions (June 14, 2010), available at
http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=MEMO/10/255&format=HTM
L&aged=O&1anguage=EN&guiLanguage=en.
The intention is that the measures envisaged on short selling should: [a.]
ensure Member States have the power to act to reduce systemic risks and risks
to financial stability and market integrity arising from short selling and Credit
Default Swaps, [b.] facilitate co-ordination between Member States and the
European Securities Markets Authority (ESMA) in emergency situations; [c.]
increase transparencyon the short positions held by investors; and [d.] reduce
settlement risks linked with uncovered or naked short selling.
... The options envisaged can be grouped into three types: [a.] Powers for
competent authorities to temporarily restrict or ban short selling and Credit
Default Swaps in emergency situations (subject to coordination by ESMA); [b.]
Measures to increase transparency to regulators and the market about short
selling positions, including those obtained through the use of derivatives; and
[c.] Measures to reduce settlement risks of uncovered or naked short selling.
The options under consideration also foresee powers for competent authorities
to enforce the rules and the possibility of some limited exemptions (for market
makers and shares whose principal market is outside the EU).
Id.
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instruments that were blamed for the financial crisis.3 5 As discussed
below, the hedge fund industry is a major user of credit default
swaps, and rules curtailing derivatives could disproportionally affect
hedge funds. Because of hedge funds' role in the credit derivatives
market, in combination with the market's recent failure, this Article
suggests that an increased emphasis on hedge fund lending exposure
could be justified.
The interdependence of corporate governance deficits, financial
regulation, and hedge fund regulation has so far not been studied
systematically. The Dodd-Frank Act and AIFM Directive appear to
be mostly patchworks of politically motivated rules without an
attempt to address the combined effects of deficits in different fields
of regulation. Dodd-Frank and the AIFM Directive approach the
regulation of banks and hedge funds separately, resulting in
asymmetric regulation of financial institutions (hedge fund regulation
36
versus bank regulation).
This Article shows that financial market regulation in the
European Union and the United States is suboptimal, and the
asymmetric hedge fund regulation in Dodd-Frank and the AIFM
Directive is counterproductive. The AIFM Directive could create
incentives for regulatory arbitrage and potentially cause retaliatory
action by non-EU countries. The Article explains how the Directive
could undermine the competitiveness of the European Union's
alternative investment community and the financial markets in
Europe. The approach suggested here would minimize asymmetric
hedge fund regulation by introducing hedge fund regulation via Basel
III. Many of the regulatory complications in the AIFM Directive and
Dodd-Frank Act could be avoided if the Basel Committee were to
introduce a charge for banks' lending exposure to hedge funds.
Building on the suggested increase in capital requirements for
counterparty risk in Basel III,3 Basel III could also include a charge
for banks' assets based on their lending exposure to hedge funds. To

See Dodd-Frank Act §§ 610, 619, 124 Stat. at 1611, 1620 ("Lending limits
35.
applicable to credit exposure on derivative transactions, repurchase agreements,
and borrowing
lending
securities
and
agreements,
repurchase
reverse
transactions . . . . Prohibitions on proprietary trading and certain relationships with
hedge funds and private equity funds.").
See Grant Kirkpatrick, The Corporate Governance Lessons from the
36.
Financial Crisis, 1 OECD J.: FIN. MARKET TRENDS 1-30 (2009) (showing the lack of
regulation of corporate remuneration systems before the crisis to have been one of its
biggest causes); Peter 0. Millbert, Corporate Governance of Banks After the Financial
Crisis-Theory,Evidence, Reforms 8 (European Corporate Governance Inst., Working
Paper No. 130/2009, 2010), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract
id=1448118 (discussing the lack of attention paid to banks' corporate governance
before the crisis as a major cause of the crisis).
BANK FOR INT'L SETTLEMENTS [BIS], BASEL COMM. ON BANKING
37.
SUPERVISION, CONSULTATIVE DOCUMENT: STRENGTHENING THE RESILIENCE OF THE
BANKING SECTOR 2, 5 (2010).
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minimize systemic risk in the lending practice of banks to hedge
funds, the New Basel III Accord could add a provision establishing
capital requirements for banks that includes a charge for the
particular bank's lending exposure to certain financial products, such
as derivatives, that have recently experienced higher than normal
volatility in world markets and are frequently used by hedge funds.3 8
The Basel III measure for hedge fund lending exposure could be
combined with an emphasis on banks' exposure to complex financial
products. Consequently, this could help address the link between
market failure in financial instruments and the increasing role of
hedge funds in the market for financial instruments.

II. METHODOLOGY

A well-defined set of methodological assumptions can improve
the analysis of the combined effects of deficits in different fields of
regulation that impact the hedge fund industry and international
financial markets. Legal research in de lege ferenda problems should
first identify problems of de lege lata regulation and should then
compare solutions for de lege ferenda proposals. Identifying existing
problems requires impact and comparative impact analysis of existing
regulation. Analyzing problems and suggesting solutions is possible
through the falsification of testable hypotheses. New Institutional
Economics (NIE), as a methodological instrument, supports impact
analysis and comparative impact analysis of present regulatory
structures and de lege ferenda solutions.39 NIE is a relatively young
offspring of economic theory focusing on the functioning and
development of institutions (positive analysis) and proposals for
improving existing institutions (normative analysis). Institutions are
defined as general rules or sets of general rules, together with their

European Banks Poised to Win Reprieve in Basel on Capital Rules, Bus.
38.
WEEK, July 12, 2010, http://www.businessweek.com/news/2010-07-12/european-bankspoised-to-win-reprieve-in-basel-on-capital-rules.html.
39.
EIRIK G. FURUBOTN & RUDOLF RICHTER, INSTITUTIONS AND ECONOMIC
THEORY: THE CONTRIBUTION OF THE NEW INSTITUTIONAL ECONOMICS 35-37 (2d ed.
2005) [hereinafter FURUBOTN & RICHTER, INSTITUTIONS]; DOUGLASS C. NORTH,
INSTITUTIONS, INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE AND ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE 3 (1990); RUDOLF
RICHTER & EIRIK G. FURUBOTN, NEUE INSTITUTIONENOKONOMIK (3d ed. 2003); STEFAN
VOIGT, INSTITUTIONENOKONOMIK (2d ed. 2009); OLIVER E. WILLIAMSON, THE ECONOMIC
INSTITUTIONS OF CAPITALISM 15-16 (1985); Ronald Coase, The New Institutional

Economics, 88 AM. ECON. REV. 72, 72-74 (1984); Christian Kirchner, Public Choice and
New Institutional Economics: A Comparative Analysis in Search of Co-operation
Potentials, in PUBLIC ECONOMICS AND PUBLIC CHOICE 19, 32 (Pio Baake & Rainald

Borck eds., 2007); Oliver E. Williamson, Transaction-CostEconomics: The Governance
of ContractualRelations, 22 J.L. & ECON. 233, 233 (1979).
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enforcement mechanisms. 40 Both legal rules and standards are
regarded as institutions if they are enforced, regardless of whether
they are created by a legislator or by a private standard setter. 41
Institutional economics emphasizes the importance of informal
42
institutions, such as social norms, rather than formal institutions.
Limiting the analysis to a subset of formal institutions, such as legal
institutions, would ignore important problems. Including formal and
informal institutions in the analysis is particularly helpful in
analyzing corporate governance issues, in which social norms and
formal institutions are often involved simultaneously.
Institutional economics distinguishes between the game and the
rules of the game. 4 3 While traditional economics deals with the game
itself, institutional economics focuses on the impact of the rules of the
game, i.e., institutions. 44 Institutional changes lead to reactions by
In order to predict such
the addressees of those institutions.
reactions, institutional economics works with a set of assumptions.
Some of the core assumptions, including scarcity of resources,
methodological individualism, and self-interested rational behavior,
are shared with neoclassical economics. 45 Other assumptions in
institutional economics are modified: bounded rationality is replacing
the assumption of full rationality4 6 and is being complemented by the
assumption of opportunistic behavior. 47 Behavioral economics has
criticized the rationality assumption and offered new insights into
48
how actors behave in different situations and settings. Institutional
49
economics stresses that information is systematically incomplete.
Many of these modified assumptions have found their way into
0
modern economic analysis of financial markets and the modern

40.
note 39.
41.
42.

FURUBOTN & RICHTER, INSTITUTIONS, supra note 39, at 7; VOIGT, supra
VOIGT, supra note 39.
Id.

For instance, corporate governance would here be the game itself or a set of
43.
rules for the game. Financial reporting would be distinguished from rules and
standards on financial reporting.
FURUBOTN & RICHTER, INSTITUTIONS, supra note 39, at 7.
44.
Id.
45.
VOIGT, supra note 39, at 22-23.
46.
Id. at 88-89; FURUBOTN & RICHTER, INSTITUTIONS, supra note 39, at 5.
47.
Christine Jolls et al., A Behavioral Approach to Law and Economics, in
48.
BEHAVIORAL LAw & EcONOMICS 13, 20 (Cass R. Sunstein ed., 2000); Daniel Kahneman,
New Challenges to the Rationality Assumption, 150 J. OF INSTITUTIONAL AND
THEORETICAL ECON. 18, 36 (1994); Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky, Prospect
Theory: An Analysis of Decision Under Risk, 47 ECONOMETRICA 263, 263 (1979).
VOIGT, supra note 39, at 237-38.
49.
HERSH SHEFRIN, BEYOND GREED AND FEAR: UNDERSTANDING BEHAVIORAL
50.
FINANCE AND THE PSYCHOLOGY OF INVESTING 1 (2000); ANDREI SHLEIFER, INEFFICIENT

MARKETS: AN INTRODUCTION TO BEHAVIORAL FINANCE 10 (2000).
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theory of financial reporting. 51 Decisionmakers in financial markets
are confronted with asymmetric information, opportunistic behavior,
and a number of rationality anomalies. Recognition of the abovementioned assumptions may improve the analysis of the combined
effects of deficits in different fields of regulation impacting the hedge
fund industry, as well as the predicted reactions of market
participants to changes in the institutional framework of hedge
funds.

III. HEDGE FUND REGULATION IN THE AFTERMATH OF
THE FINANCIAL CRISIS

Regulators can use regulatory authority over entities that
interact with hedge funds to regulate hedge funds indirectly.
Alternatively, they can use a number of regulatory tools-including
registration, capital, leverage, margin, and reporting requirementsto regulate hedge funds directly. Rules in the AIFM Directive and
the Dodd-Frank Act combine direct and indirect measures. The
AIFM Directive introduces the possibility of European-wide
regulation of hedge fundS52 and regulatory oversight of a "shadow
banking system" that is presently unsupervised. 53 As part of the
Dodd-Frank Act, under Title IV, Congress enacted the Private Fund
Investment Advisers Registration Act of 2010 (PFIARA). 54
Expanding the reporting requirements of private advisers to provide
greater protection to investors,55 PFIARA establishes rules and
regulations for the registration of private funds with the SEC. 56
Additionally, PFIARA requires that hedge funds with more than $150
million in assets under management (AUM) register with the SEC as
investment advisers and disclose to the agency information about
their trades and portfolios.5 7

51.
JENS WDSTEMANN,
INSTITUTIONENOKONOMIK UND INTERNATIONALE
RECHNUNGSLEGUNGSORDNUNGEN (2002).
Commission AIF Proposal,supranote 4, at 2.
52.
BLOOMENTHAL & WOLFF, supra note 33, § 1:160.
53.
54.
Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection (Dodd-Frank)
Act tit. IV, Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010) (to be codified as amended in
scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.).
55.
156 CONG. REc. H4977 (daily ed. June 29, 2010) (Joint Explanatory
Statement of Title IV).
56.
Dodd-Frank Act §§ 402, 408, 124 Stat. at 1570, 1575.
See id. § 408, 124 Stat. at 1575.
57.
Section 203 of the Investment Advisers Act of 1940 (15 U.S.C. 80b-3) is
amended by adding at the end the following:
"(m) EXEMPTION OF AND REPORTING BY CERTAIN PRIVATE FUND
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1. The A1FM Directive
The AIFM Directive is the European Union's response to the
financial crisis of 2008-2009.58
In 2008, the EU Commission
observed that the ensuing credit crisis underscored the accumulation
of risk in the hedge fund sector and insufficient monitoring by
regulators.5 9 Although the drafters of the Directive did not contend
that hedge funds and other alternative investment funds were the
cause of the financial crisis, they pointed to the risks associated with
hedge funds as a factor that may have contributed to turbulence in
the market.6 0 In February 2009, a EU Commission hearing on hedge
funds reviewed the role of hedge funds in the financial crisis and
suggested that legislative initiatives be consistent on a global level,
because these industries have an international character.6 1 The
AIFM Directive harmonizes the regulation of alternative investment
funds across Europe.62
a)

A Controversial Drafting Process

The proposed EU rules in the AIFM Directive have been
substantially redrafted, and numerous parties lobbied the EU
Commission and Parliament to accept their changes.63 As a result,

ADVISERS."(1) IN GENERAL.-The Commission shall provide an exemption from
the registration requirements under this section to any investment adviser
of private funds, if each of such investment adviser acts solely as an adviser
to private funds and has assets under management in the United States of
less than $150,000,000.
Id.
58.
CommissionAIF Proposal,supra note 4, at 2.
59.
Working Document of the Commission Services (DG Internal Market):
Consultation Paper on Hedge Funds, at 7 (2008), available at http://ec.europa.eu/
internal market/consultations/docs/hedgefunds/consultation paperen.pdf.
Commission AIF Proposal, supra note 4, at 3; see also Proposal for a
60.
Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on Alternative Investment
Fund Managers and Amending Directives, COM (2009) 0207, at 1.1 (Apr. 29, 2009)
[hereinafter Proposalon Alternative Investment], available at http://www.europarl.europa.eu
/oeil/FindByDocnum.do?lang-en&docnum=COM/2009/207.
EU Commission Open Hearing on Hedge Funds and PrivateEquity, at 1, 18
61.
(Feb. 26-27, 2009) [hereinafter EU Commission Hearing], available at http://ec.europ
a.eu/internal market/investment/docs/conference/summary-en.pdf. The Commission
also suggested that strict reporting be required on capital, leverage, investment
strategy, investment portfolio, links with systemic financial institutions, source of
funds, and risk management metrics.
62.
Id. at 9.
See James Watts, United Kingdom: AIFM Directive Update, MONDAQ Bus.
63.
BRIEFING, Mar. 24, 2010, http://www.mondaq.com/article.asp?articleid=96668 (noting
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competing drafts of the AIFM Directive circulated in the European
Parliament and among member states. 6 4 Many provisions in the
drafts were highly contentious in some countries. Other countries,
such as the United Kingdom, had already implemented requirements
similar to those in the AIFM Directive. For instance, the United
Kingdom already regulates the managers of alternative funds aimed
at institutional investors.6 5
Despite frequent redrafting, the various drafts of the AIFM
Directive consistently required hedge funds to register with
government agencies. 66 All of the competing drafts also required
disclosures to regulators and investors, and they included capital
adequacy requirements for hedge funds. 67 Moreover, all of the
versions required regulatory oversight for previously unregulated
funds.68 Hedge funds were also required to apply for authorization by
the respective EU member state and, upon authorization, required to
69
provide certain levels of disclosure to regulators and investors.
Furthermore, all versions of the AIFM Directive provided for

that the versions proposed by the EU Parliament and the EU Council were lobbied on
behalf of industry participants).
Commission AIF Proposal, supra note 4; Draft Report, supra note 26;
64.
Report on the Proposalfor a Directiveof the EuropeanParliamentand of the Council on
Alternative Investment Fund Managers and Amending Directives (March 10, 2010)
at
available
Proposal],
Parliament
EU
on
Report
[hereinafter
http://register.consilium.europa.eulpdf/en/10/st06/st06795-re03.enlO.pdf.
See Matthew Lewis, Comment, A TransatlanticDilemma: A Comparative
65.
Review of American and British Hedge Fund Regulation, 22 EMORY INT'L L. REV. 347,
355 (2008) (noting that U.K. hedge funds must be authorized under the Financial
Services Act, which lacks exemptions that were provided in U.S. legislation).
See Commission AIF Proposal,supra note 4, at 22; Draft Report, supra note
66.
26, at 7; Report on EU ParliamentProposal,supra note 64, at 25.
See Linda E. Rappaport, Global FinancialRegulatory Reform Proposals,in
67.
PRAc. L. INST., TAX LAW AND ESTATE PLANNING COURSE HANDBOOK SERIES: TAX LAW
AND PRACTICE: HOT ISSUES IN EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION 83, 85 (2010) (noting that

though there are separate, revised drafts, the main proposals include: "Compulsory
authorisation of fund managers located in the EU in order to manage
funds; . . . ongoing reporting obligations to regulatory authorities; . . . [and] additional

disclosure obligations for managers engaging in high levels of leverage and limits on
leverage (mainly affecting hedge funds).").
See CommissionAIF Proposal,supra note 4, at 20; Draft Report, supra note
68.
26, at 6; Report on EU ParliamentProposal,supra note 64, at 3.
See CommissionAIF Proposal,supra note 4, at 8, 9.
69.
To operate in the European Union, all AIFM will be required to obtain
authorization from the competent authority of their home Member
State.... [T]he AIFM will also be required to report to the competent authority
on a regular basis on the principal markets and instruments in which it trades,
its principal exposures, performance data and concentrations of risk.
Id.; Press Release, Europa, Financial Services: Commission Proposes EU Framework
for Managers of Alternative Investment Funds 1 (Apr. 29, 2009), available at
http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=IP/09/669.
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minimum capital requirements for hedge funds, and, depending on
the fund type, a limit on hedge fund leverage and standardization of
hedge fund manager conduct (some Directive drafts also curtail hedge
fund remuneration policies).70 Under the valuation and depository
requirements of the AIFM Directive drafts, assets were required to be
independently valued and maintained by a depository bank.7 1 Some
drafts provided that in case of financial problems, the depository
bank could be held liable.7 2 Finally, AIFMs were mandated to
disclose and report performance data, exposures, and risk on a
regular basis.7 3
The latest version of the AIFM Directive, reviewed by the
European Parliament in August 2010,74 provided exemptions for
social security, pension, and employee savings programs.75 It also
provided exemptions from the registration requirement for "nonsystemically relevant" AIFMs. 76 Funds using leverage were exempt if
they had less than C100 million AUM. 77 If funds did not use leverage,
they were exempt if their total AUM did not exceed C500 million.78

See Commission AIF Proposal, supra note 4, at 14 ("It is necessary to
70.
provide for the application of minimum capital requirements to ensure the continuity
and the regularity of the management services provided by the AIFM."). Articles 22
and 23 of the Commission AIF Proposal provide requirements related to assessment
and disclosure of AIFs employing high levels of leverage. Id. at 34. "The proposed
Directive contains the principles necessary to ensure that AIFM are subject to
consistently high standards of transparency and regulatory oversight in the European
12(c)
Id. at 8; see also Report on EU ParliamentProposal,supra note 64,
Union ...
("In order to promote supervisory convergences in the assessment of remuneration
policies and practices, the Committee of European Securities Regulators should ensure
the existence of guidelines on sound remuneration policies in the AIFM sector.").
71.
There is significant discourse and disagreement between member states over
the depository rule. See Martin Arnold et al., Alternative Visions, FIN. TIMES, May 14, 2010,
http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/3bee761c-5eef-1 ldf-af86-00144feab49a.html#axzzlCfzbNK8s
("[M]ember states remain deeply split over the depository rule. France, where investors
were badly stung by the Bernard Madoff fraud, is pushing hard for more investor protection,
while UK funds and investors view the proposed rules as prohibitively expensive.").
72.
Id.
73.
EU Commission Hearing,supra note 61, at 1.
74.
Proposalfor a Directive of the European Parliamentand of the Council on
Alternative Investment Fund Managers and Amending Directives 2003/41/EC and
2009/65/EC, at 3 (Aug. 27, 2010) [hereinafter 2010 Proposal].
75.
Id.
76.
Id.
77.
See id. at 4.
AIFM which either directly or indirectly through a company with which the
AIFM is linked by common management or control, or by a substantive direct
or indirect holding, manage portfolios of AIF whose assets under management,
including any assets acquired through use of leverage, in total do not exceed a
threshold of E100 million . ...
Id.
78.

See id.
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Perhaps one of the most contested provisions of the AIFM
Directive was related to AIFMs in non-EU countries. 7 9 Non-EU
AIFMs doing business in the European Union received different
treatment in various proposals and drafts of the AIFM Directive.8 0
Some drafts granted access only to EU-based funds but allowed
individual member states to determine whether sophisticated
investors could invest in funds managed outside the European
Union.8 1 To do business, non-EU funds were required to apply to
each member state individually. 8 2 A version promulgated by the
European Parliament allowed AIFMs in non-EU countries to obtain a
"passport" to do business in any EU member state, provided they
obtained authorization.8 3 The European Parliament's draft focused
on whether a fund's home country provided basic rules on
transparency, taxation, and money laundering. 84
If certain

AIFM which either directly or indirectly through a company with which the
AIFM is linked by common management or control, or by a substantive direct
or indirect holding, manage portfolios of AIF whose assets under management,
in total do not exceed a threshold of C500 million when the portfolio of AIF
consists of AIF that are not leveraged and have no redemption rights
exercisable during a period of 5 years following the date of initial investment in
each AIF.
Id.
79.
Press Release, Council of the European Union, 3015th Council Meeting:
Economic and Financial Affairs (May 18, 2010) [hereinafter Council Meeting],
available at http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=PRES/10/123&fo
rmat=HTML&aged=o&lg-en&guiLanguage=en.
80.
Commission AIF Proposal, supra note 4, at 19; see also Report on EU
Parliament Proposal,supra note 64, 19 ("In order to ensure investor protection, the
right for an AIFM to market AIF to professional investors in the Community on the
basis of a single authorisation (the European passport for AIFM) should only be
granted where the AIF is established in a Member State.").
81.
See Report on EU ParliamentProposal,supra note 64, 19 ("[T]he right for
an AIFM to market AIF to professional investors in the Union on the basis of a single
authorisation (the European passport for AIFM) should only be granted where the AIF
is established in a Member State."); Niki Tait, EU Tries to Break Logjam on Hedge
Funds, FIN. TIMES, Apr. 13, 2010, http://cachef.ft.com/cms/s/0/f7c20c38-4742-lldf-b25300144feab49a.html#axzzlBuKfrxHk (noting that Jean-Paul Gauzes, the French
Member of the European Parliament, proposed that non-EU managers who sought to
market in the European Union could apply for a "passport" if they agreed to the
European Union's new rules regarding registration and leverage, and if the managers'
home countries agreed to regulate and oversee the managers' compliance).
82.
Tait, supra note 81.
Draft Report, supra note 26, at 81.
83.
84.
See Tait, supra note 81 ("Mr Gauzes' revisions would also allow funds based
outside the EU to gain passport rights if the jurisdiction in which they were housed
met four conditions: concerning fiscal standards, rules on information exchange
between supervisors, reciprocity and anti-money laundering rules."); JENNIFER WOOD,
THE POTENTIAL IMPACT OF THE PROPOSED ALTERNATIVE INVESTMENT FUND MANAGERS
DIRECTIVE ON INVESTMENT
MANAGERS
IN THE E.U. AND U.S.
4 (2009),

http://www.dechert.com/library/The%20Potential%20Impact%20of%2Othe%20Proposed
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requirements were fulfilled, the draft allowed non-EU funds to
subscribe to EU principles via the "passport regime" and sell their
funds in the European Union. 85 Commentators expected that the
parliamentary draft would be favored by the hedge fund industry.86
Even that draft, however, was expected to burden the industry
because funds would incur costs in satisfying the EU standards, and
regulators from their home jurisdictions were expected to ensure that
these non-EU funds comply with EU rules.8 7
The latest proposal of the AIFM Directive also provided "Specific
Rules in Relation to Third Countries."88 Under these rules, non-EU
AIFMs were able to market funds in the European Union if they
provided both investors and regulators with sufficient information to
oversee systemic risk.8 9 Regulators in the state where the AIFM was
incorporated were required to cooperate with regulators in the
member states where the funds were marketed.9 0 Under this draft,
the ESMA was required to decide if the depositories in the AIFM's
country of incorporation were sufficiently regulated and met
The rules specified stringent
minimum capital requirements. 9 '
conditions for managing, marketing, and registering non-EU

%20Alternative%20Investment%2OFund%2OManagers%2ODirective%200n%20Investm
ent%20Managers%20in%20EU%20and%20US.pdf (listing the strict pre-conditions
member states must meet "to authorize a non-EU AIFM to market units under the
Directive to professional investors in that Member State").
See BLOOMENTHAL & WOLFF, supra note 33, at 2 ("[The Directive] will
85.
provide an 'EU passport' for the marketing of those third country funds which comply
with stringent requirements on regulation, supervision and cooperation, including on
tax matters."); Martin Sjoberg, The Cutting Hedge, FT ADVISER, June 17, 2010,
http://www.ftadviser.comlFinancialAdviser/Investments/AssetClass/Alternativelnvest
ments/HedgeFunds/Features/article/20100617/d9cb3280-67dc-1ldf-90cb-00144f2af8e8/
The-cutting-hedge.jsp ("[Tihe new directive provides alternative investment funds with
a passport allowing them to market their funds throughout all 27 EU member states
once they are authorized in their home member state."); see also supra note 81.
86.
See Jim Baird, United Kingdom: Continued Controversy Over the EU
Alternative Investment Fund Managers Directive, FIN. SERVS. Q. REP. (Dechert LLP,
London, U.K.), July 15, 2010, at 7 ("At first glance, the Parliamentary Draft looks more
positive in that it expressly extends the marketing 'passport' to non-EU AIFM and AIF.
However, the conditions that would apply are so extensive that it is doubtful whether
these could be met, even by many developed jurisdictions.").
See id. at 8.
87.
A further difficulty under the Parliamentary Draft would be that the "passport"
for non-EU AIFM and AIF would not provide for a single point of entry into the
EU, as it does for EU AIFM. Instead, cooperation agreements would be
required to be entered into between the relevant third country and each
relevant Member State before a meaningful marketing network would be
available.
Id.
88.
89.
90.
91.

2010 Proposal,supra note 74, at 72.
Id. ch. 7.
Id.
Id.
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AIFMs.9 2 Regardless of compliance with these strict standards, some
countries generally opposed non-EU funds trading within the
European Union.93
b)

The Final Version

The final version of the AIFM Directive was promulgated on
November 11, 2010.94 It sets out core provisions on Alternative
Investment Fund Managers (AIFMs) and Alternative Investment
It defines AIFMs and AIFs, and it addresses
Funds (AIFs).
thresholds and exemptions from the AIFM Directive, a passport
regime, rules on third country funds, depositaries, depositary
liability, remuneration of AIFMs, governance of AIFs, restrictions on
delegation of AIFM functions, transparency requirements, asset
stripping by private equity funds, leverage, short selling,
AIFs are
authorization of AIFMs, and capital requirements.9 5
collective investment undertakings outside of the scope of
Undertakings for Collective Investment in Transferable Securities
(UCITS) that (i) raise capital from a number of investors, and (ii)
96
invest capital in accordance with predefined investment policies.
Generally, any AIF will fall within the scope of the AIFM Directive if
97
it has an AIFM purveying marketing or management services.
There are certain exemptions for (i) AIFMs that manage AFs with
less than e100 million;98 or (ii) AIFMs managing AIFs with total
assets of less than C500 million, provided the AIFs are not leveraged
and have no redemption rights for five years after the date of initial
The AIFM Directive also provides
investment in each AIF.9 9
exemptions from the registration requirement for "non-systemically
relevant" AIFMs.10 0

Id.
92.
See Jonathan Williams, France's Proposed Changes Jeopardizing AlFM
93.
Directive, Says Hewitt, INVESTMENT & PENSIONS EUR., Sept. 29, 2010.
French finance minister Christine Lagarde was expected to recommend
changes to the directive that would see minimum national standards
introduced that each country could apply independently. The revisions would
do away with the proposed 'passport' model, which would allow a fund, once
cleared, to trade and be based in any country in the European Union.
Id.
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.
100.

November 11 Directive, supra note 4.
Id.
Id. ch. I, art. 3(1)(b).
See id. ch. I, art. 3(1)(a) (defining "activities related to the assets of AIF').
Id. ch. I, art. 2a(2)(a).
Id. ch. I, art. 2a(2)(b).
Id.
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Under the new rules, in order to market the shares of AIFs or
provide management services to AIFs, an AIFM is required to be
authorized by its home state regulator. Authorization in one member
state allows the AIFM to operate in all member states. 10 ' Like most
of the drafts, the final version of the AIFM Directive provides for the
creation of a EU-wide passport allowing authorized AIFMs to
advertise their funds throughout the European Union.102 Authorized
managers can market third-country (non-EU) funds in the European
Union, provided the third-country AIFs and AIFMs comply with the
However, private placement
requirements of the Directive.10 3
regimes imposing certain conditions will remain in place
provisionally. 104
As for the politically contentious depositary requirement,
according to the final version of the AIFM Directive, AIFs are
required to have a depositary. 0 5 Real estate funds and private
equity funds are allowed to use professional advisers as
depositaries.1 06 All other AIFs will use investment firms and credit
As for the controversial element of depositary
institutions.1 0 7
liability, the final version of the AIFM Directive seems to involve an
intentional failure test.10 8 However, some elements of strict liability
remain.10 9 Under the AIFM Directive, AIFMs' pay will be subject to
As such, AIFMs'
the Capital Requirements Directive." 0
overall
on
limitations
including
structure,
remuneration
compensation and bonuses, may be substantially aligned with that of
bankers.
The governance structure under the AIFM Directive introduces
the concept of fiduciary duties, or an equivalent thereof. AIFMs
acting on behalf of AFs and managing AIFs must act in the best
interest of the AIFs."'i Further specifying this duty, the Directive
includes provisions on the independent valuation of AIFs' assets, risk
management, due diligence, conflicts of interest, separation of
valuation operations from risk and portfolio management, and the

101.
procedure
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.

Id. ch. VII, art. 35a. However, the AIFM is still subject to notification
via its home state. Id. ch. I, art. 2a(3)(a)-(b).
Id. ch. VII, art. 35a.
Id.
Id. pmbl. I 28a.
Id. pmbl. I 15b.
Id. pmbl. $ 15c.
Id.
Id. ch. III, sec. 4a, art. 18a(11).
Id. pmbl. J 11-12.
Id. annex II.
Id. ch. III, sec. 1, art. 9(1).
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integrity of the markets.1 12 The AIFM Directive also requires
enhanced disclosure to authorities and investors. 113
Finally, externally appointed AIFMs are required under the
AIFM Directive to comply with an initial capital requirement of
C125,000.114 AIFMs are also required to comply with limits on the
amount of leverage they can use. 115 Moreover, member states of the
European Union can impose limits on leverage in emergency
situations. 116
c)

Impact Assessment

The AIFM Directive seems to curtail the ability of European
institutions and individuals to invest with managers or funds
domiciled outside the European Union." 7 Hedge funds domiciled in
traditional alternative investment fund industry centers, such as the
Cayman Islands, British Virgin Islands, Jersey, Guernsey, the United
States, Canada, Switzerland, Hong Kong, Singapore, Japan,
Australia, and South Africa, may be affected by the AIFM
Directive.118 Experience with the AIFM Directive will show if it
causes a reduction in investor choice, increased costs, and lower
returns." 9 If AIFM Directive provisions impair investors' choice and

112.

Id.

113.
Id.
See id. ch. II, art. 6a(1)-(2) (noting that the capital base for an internally
114.
managed AIF is C300,000 and that "[w]here an AIFM is appointed as external manager
of one or more AIF, the AIFM shall have an initial capital of at least EUR 125 000,
taking into account the following paragraphs").
Id. ch. III, sec. 1 art. 25(7).
115.
Id. ch. III, sec. 1 art. 25(3).
116.
See Commission Staff Working Document Accompanying the Proposalfor a
.117.
Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on Alternative Investment
Fund Managers and Amending Directives 2004/39/EC and 2009/... IEC: Impact
Assessment, at 53, COM (2009) 207 (Apr. 30, 2009) [hereinafter Commission Staff
Working Document] ("AIFM domiciled in a third country will not be covered by the
measure and will therefore not be able to market their AIF or to provide AIFM services
in the EU under this Directive unless established/authorised in the EU in accordance
with the proposed Directive.").
118.
See Sjoberg, supra note 85 ("[The so-called third country issue] has
generated much publicity and has caused the most discussion with many
commentators predicting an exodus of hedge funds and investment talent from London
to offshore centres such as the Cayman Islands and Switzerland.").
See DARINA BARRETT & BRIAN CLAVIN, KPMG FIN. SERVS., FEELING THE
119.
HEAT? ALTERNATIVE INVESTMENT FUND MANAGERS DIRECTIVE-ASSET MANAGERS
GLOBAL SURVEY 11-12 (2010), http://www.kpmg.com/IE/en/IssuesAnd Insights/Articles
(noting that when
PublicationsfDocuments/FS-InvestmentMgt/AIFMD-Survey.pdf
asked about investment opportunities, 44 percent of investment managers surveyed
felt that it has not yet been proven that the AIFM Directive will impact returns
because of a reduction in investment opportunities, and 43 percent of investment
managers do believe the AIFM Directive will impact returns by reducing investment
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curtail their ability to select investments from the best available
products globally, there is a risk that this will impact returns. More
specifically, reduction of choice for EU investors could drive down
returns for pension funds because pension fund managers may not
have the ability to acquire their top picks for investors. The
restrictions and compliance costs that the AIFM Directive imposes on
international investors could precipitate a reduction in returns and
higher costs. As a result, the AIFM Directive could undermine
Europe's competitiveness.120
The obstacles for non-EU funds and managers to access the EU
121
Curtailing
market seem protectionist in effect, if not in intent.
entry into the European Union could signal a change in Europe's
place as a global center for financial services and as a destination for
Discrimination against non-EU
international investment.1 2 2
jurisdictions could provoke retaliatory action. As a consequence,
retaliatory actions and a lack of intra-European cooperation could
damage the European financial services industry and the whole
European economy. 123 Further, the AIFM Directive could impact

opportunity; when asked about costs, 54 percent of investment managers surveyed
believe the AIFM Directive will increase costs, thus lowering returns; and only 10
percent believe the proposals will have minimal impact).
See id. C[A] not insignificant [26] percent believe that non-EU jurisdictions
120.
which might offer comparatively fewer investment restrictions, could be more
attractive for this talent."); EUROPEAN PRIVATE EQUITY AND VENTURE CAPITAL ASs'N,
THE EFFECT OF THE ALTERNATIVE INVESTMENT FUND MANAGERS DIRECTIVE ON
INVESTING IN VENTURE CAPITAL 3 (2010) (reporting that when asked "[i]f you could not
invest in venture beyond Europe to what degree would you change your investment in
the European venture capital asset class," one-third of managers responded they would
"reduce by over 1/3," and one-third responded that they would "leave the venture
capital asset class").
See Wood, supra note 84, at 3, 5.
121.
[A]n authorized AIFM is required to ensure that a depositary (i.e., custodian) is
appointed to fulfill various safekeeping responsibilities in relation to the AIFs
the AIFM manages. The AIFM is also required to ensure that the depositary is
an authorized credit institution having its registered office in the EU. . . . This
would be unworkable for an international investment fund investing in non-EU
markets.
Id.
See id. at 6 ("The requirement that the depositary's liability towards
122.
investors is not affected by reason of the delegation to a third country depositary of all
or part of its tasks is unlikely to encourage depositaries to agree to provide services to
AIFs that invest in these markets.").
See Commission Staff Working Document, supra note 117, at 57, 85.
123.
Gaps and inconsistencies in approaches to the registration and authorisation of
AIFM in the EU may impede the effective oversight of the sector and varying
standards may provoke regulatory arbitrage between jurisdictions. . ..
A majority of respondents are not convinced that a "purely" European
response is likely to be successful. They feel that it may even have adverse
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small firms across Europe and make it more difficult for new
businesses to be created.124 The AIFM Directive could also result in
negative social externalities across Europe if foreign investments are
adversely influenced. Moreover, a possible consequence could be that
European citizens have to pay higher pension contributions and
insurance premiums.125
The AIFM Directive provisions on the role of depositaries and
custodians may have been influenced by the losses suffered by French
investors in the Bernard Madoff scandal.126 Providing for strict
liability for depositarieS 12 7 in certain circumstances may be
overreaching. Depositaries now need to weigh the risks and benefits
of providing services to alternative investment funds within the
European Union. If this risk assessment turns out negative, the
business of depositories and, implicitly, hedge funds could be
affected.1 28

2. Dodd-FrankHedge Fund Rules
The Dodd-Frank Act, the largest overhaul of U.S. financial
regulations since the 1930s, includes several important provisions on
hedge funds. As part of this reform package, the Private Fund
Investment Advisers Registration Act of 2010 (PFIARA) was enacted

effects on the European asset management industry, exposing it to regulatory
arbitrage.
Id.
124.
See Henry Smith, AIFM Directive Scares Off EU Hedge Funds, FT
MANDATE, June 2010, http://www.ftmandate.comnews/fullstory.php/aid/2387/A1FM
directive scares offEUhedge.funds.html (asserting that the cost of the new
regulations would be prohibitive for smaller firms).
125.
See The AIFM Directive:Another European Mess: Plans to Regulate Private
Equity and Hedge Funds Takes Two Steps Forward, ECONOMIST, May 18, 2010,
http://www.economist.com/node/16156357 ("[L]egislators want to increase custodians'
liability for the assets they look after. Pension funds and other investors fear they will
be charged a higher premium by custodians as a result.").
126.
See supra note 71.
See discussion on depositary liability supraPart III. Lb.
127.
128.

See EUROPEAN PRIVATE EQUITY AND VENTURE CAPITAL Ass'N, supra note

120, at 6.
The AIFMD calls for the use of third-party depository to increase transparency
of individual investments by management companies. Share certificates will
need to be held by the depositary for safe keeping. Draw-downs from investors
will need to be held by the depositary as will proceeds arising on the sale of a
portfolio company. The cost implications are significant and of major concern to
venture capital firms.
Id.
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on July 21, 2010.129 The legislation is intended to close regulatory
gaps and end the speculative trading practices that contributed to the
The Dodd-Frank Act restricts a
2008-2009 financial crisis.1 30
banking entity from sponsoring or having an ownership interest in a
private equity or hedge fund if such investments amount to more
than 3 percent of the bank's Tier 1 capital or if the bank's interest is
more than 3 percent of the total ownership of the fund.13 1 This
restriction allows banks to continue engaging in proprietary trading
under safer, more client-friendly terms, 132 a practice that is otherwise
curtailed by the Volcker Rule, 3 3 which would constrain banks from
engaging in proprietary trading and owning or investing in hedge
funds and private equity funds. Banks have several years to conform
to the restrictions imposed by the statute. 134 Most significantly,
PFIARA requires hedge funds with more than $150 million AUM to
register with the SEC as investment advisers and disclose to the
35
The
agency information about their trades and portfolios.1
registration requirement is intended to enable the SEC to gather

Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection (Dodd-Frank)
129.
Act tit. IV, Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1570, 1570-80 (to be codified as amended in
scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.).
Ben Bernanke stated, "The financial reform legislation approved by the
130.
Congress today represents a welcome and far-reaching step toward preventing a replay
of the recent financial crisis." Tom Braithwaite, U.S. Senate Passes FinancialReform,
FIN. TIMES, July 15, 2010, http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/6b9d4542-9026-1ldf-ad26-00144fe
ab49a.html#axzzlCZnblrTI.
See Dodd-Frank Act § 619, 124 Stat. at 1627 ("[I]n no case may the
131.
aggregate of all of the interests of the banking entity in all such funds exceed 3 percent
of the Tier 1 capital of the banking entity.").
156 CONG. REC. S5897 (daily ed. July 15, 2010) (statement of Sen. Jeff
132.
Merkley). The restriction allows banks to continue to engage in some limited
traditional asset management businesses, including sponsoring and offering hedge and
private equity funds.
See 156 CONG. REC. S5886 (daily ed. July 15, 2010) (statement of Sen. Ted
133.
Kaufman).
[T]he scaled-back Volcker Rule contains a large loophole that allows
megabanks to continue to own, control and manage hedge funds and private
equity funds under certain conditions. Most notably, it includes a de minimis
exception that permits banks to invest up to three percent of Tier 1 capital in
hedge funds and private equity funds so long as their investments don't
constitute more than three percent ownership in the individual funds.
Id.
See 156 CONG. REC. S5889 (daily ed. July 15, 2010) (statement of Sen. Kay
134.
Hagan) (noting that § 619(c)(2) provides a two-year period from the effective date of the
Act before the restrictions will apply).
See Dodd-Frank Act § 408, 124 Stat. at 1575 ("The Commission shall
135.
provide an exemption from the registration requirements under this section to any
investment adviser of private funds, if each of such investment adviser acts solely as an
adviser to private funds and has assets under management in the United States of less
than $150,000,000.").
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appropriate information to prevent fraud, limit systemic risk, and
provide information to investors. 136
a)

History of Hedge Fund Registration in the United States

PFIARA could be the last chapter in a debate that began with
the inception of the hedge fund industry in the 1960s. Before the
SEC adopted the investment adviser registration safe harbor in Rule
203(b)(3)13 7 (now redundant under PFIARA) in 1985, it issued a long
line of no-action letters requiring investment advisers to look through
an entity and count each individual advisee or member as a separate
client.' 3 8 The SEC did not give much other guidance to the investing

136.
156 CONG. REC. S5902-01, S5928 (daily ed. July 15, 2010) (statement of
Sen. Dick Durbin).
137.
Investment Advisers Act of 1940 § 203(b)(3), 15 U.S.C. 80b-11(a) (2000).
Under Section 203(b)(3) of the Advisers Act, an adviser was exempt if it had less than
fifteen clients in the past twelve months, if it did not "hold itself out" to the public, i.e.,
did not offer investment advisory services to the general public, nor act as investment
adviser to a registered investment company or business development company. In
calculating the number of clients under § 203(b)(3), U.S. and non-U.S. clients had to be
taken into account. Non-U.S. fund managers only had to count their U.S. clients.
Andrew J. Donahue, Dir. Div. of Inv. Mgmt., Sec. & Exch. Comm'n, Speech by SEC
Staff: Regulating Hedge Funds and other Private Investment Pools (Feb. 19, 2010),
available
at
http://www.sec.gov/news/speechl2010/spch021910ajd.htm.
Under
§ 203(b)(3)-1 of the Advisers Act, a limited partnership itself could be counted as a
single client of the general partner or any other person acting as the investment
adviser, provided that investment advice to the partnership was based on the
partnership's objectives rather than on the needs and objectives of the limited partners.
This rule also applied to an offshore fund in the corporate form, which may in general
be treated as one client by an adviser. Id.
138.
See Ruth Levine, SEC No-Action Letter, 1976 SEC No-Act. LEXIS 2719 at
*2 (Dec. 15, 1976).
Generally, we recognize limited partnerships as legal entities. However, if the
partnership was organized by an adviser, or an affiliate of the adviser, the
members of such partnership would probably each be counted in determining
how many clients the adviser was serving, and the assets of those members
might be treated separately for purposes of determining whether a variable fee
could be charged.
Id. at *2; David Shilling, SEC No-Action Letter, 1976 SEC No-Act. LEXIS 865 at *3
(Apr. 3, 1976) ("In the context of investment clubs we would generally consider the
individual members, rather than the club, as the advisees."); see also B.J. Smith, SEC
No-Action Letter, 1975 SEC No-Act. LEXIS 2642 at *1-2 (Dec. 25, 1975) ("As stated in
our earlier reply we would regard your advice as being given to the individuals in the
club. Accordingly, that exemption would not appear to apply to you if you were engaged
to advise an investment club with fifteen or more members."); Wofsey, Rosen, Kweskin
& Kuriansky, SEC No-Action Letter, 1974 SEC No-Act. LEXIS 2154 at *3 (Apr. 25,
1974) ("For the purposes of the 15 client test (assuming no public offering is made) we
would regard each member of the club as an advisee, rather than the club as one
entity."); S.S. Programs, Ltd., SEC No-Action Letter, 1974 SEC No-Act. LEXIS 599 at
*6 (Oct. 17, 1974).
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community, and its reliance on no-action letters alone led to
significant legal uncertainty.' 3 9 A lack of guidance may create legal
14
uncertainty,140 and legal uncertainty generates transaction costs. 1
The Second Circuit's inclination to change its position further
exacerbated legal uncertainty: from 1976 to 1977, it characterized
individual limited partners as "clients" of a general partner. But in
Abrahamson v. Fleschner, the Second Circuit held that general
partners of limited partnerships investing in securities were
investment advisers.142 This decision left unanswered the question
whether the partnership, or each of the partners, should be counted
as clients.1 43 The U.S. Supreme Court later overruled that decision
on other grounds in TransAmerica Mortgage Advisors, Inc. v.
Lewis.144
The SEC did not require registration under the Investment
Advisers Act of 1940 (Advisers Act) before or after the safe harbor

In addition, since the general partner would be acting as the exclusive agency
for the partnership and would receive special compensation in the amount of 1
1/2% per annum on the asset value of the partnership, investment adviser
registration may be required for the general partner even if the partnership is
not an investment company unless the exemption of Section 203(b)(3) of the
Advisers Act is available. In this connection, we would view each partner as a
separate client for purposes of determining the number of clients the general
partner would have.
S.S. Programs, Ltd., 1974 SEC No-Act. LEXIS 599 at *6; see also Hawkeye
Bancorporation, SEC No-Action Letter, 1971 SEC No-Act. LEXIS 883 at *2 (June 11,
1971) ("It is our view that Investment Management would be rendering investment
advice to all members of the pools. If the addition of six new clients would give
Investment Management more than fourteen clients, its registration as an investment
adviser would be required.").
See Donna M. Nagy, Judicial Reliance on Regulatory Interpretations in
139.
SEC No-Action Letters: Current Problems and a Proposed Framework, 83 CORNELL L.
REV. 921, 966-67 (1998) (contending that while the investing public's reliance on SEC
no-action letters can be warranted, that reliance creates problems for courts).
See generally Helmut Wagner, Legal Uncertainty-Is Harmonization of
140.
Law the Right Answer? A Short Overview (Fern Universitit in Hagen, Discussion
Paper No. 444, 2009), http://www.fernunihagen.de/FBWIWI/forschung/beitraege/pdf/db
444.pdf (discussing and defining legal uncertainty generally).
See id. at 4 ("Legal uncertainty generates the following transaction costs:
141.
(a) costs of collecting information, (b) costs of legal disputes, (c) costs of setting
incentives for pushing through legal claims, and (d) other transaction costs.").
See Abrahamson v. Fleschner, 568 F.2d 862, 869-71 (2d Cir. 1977) (holding
142.
that general partners of an investment partnership were "investment advisers" within
the meaning of the Advisers Act).
See Robert C. Hacker & Ronald D. Rotunda, SEC Registration of Private
143.
Investment PartnershipsAfter Abrahamson v. Fleschner, 78 COLUM. L. REV. 1471, 1484
(1978) (noting that the court did not have to decide whether each limited partner is a
separate client for purposes of § 203(b)(3)).
TransAm. Mortg. Advisors, Inc. v. Lewis, 444 U.S. 11, 24-25 (1979)
144.
(holding that the Investment Advisers Act of 1940 (Advisers Act) confers a limited
private remedy to void an investment contract but does not confer any other private
causes of action, legal or equitable, thus overruling Abrahamson v. Fleschner).
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was enacted in 1985.145 The safe harbor permitted advisers to
manage large amounts of securities indirectly through several hedge
funds that collectively had hundreds of investors.1 46 Section 12 of the
Exchange Act,14 7 in combination with Rule 12g-1, 148 required
registration of any issuer with 500 holders of record of a class of
equity securities and assets in excess of $10 million. Practically
speaking, this meant that a single hedge fund could have up to 499
investors. Under Rule 203(b)(3)-1(a), an investment adviser could
count a legal organization as a single client so long as the investment
advice was based on the objectives of the legal organization rather
than the individual investment objectives of any owners of the legal
organization.1 49 Considerable uncertainty existed about whether
advisers to unregistered investment pools were required to look
through the pools to count each investor as a client or could count
each pool as a single client.15 0 Without a rule on the issue, Rule
203(b)(3)-1 was interpreted to generally allow advisers to count each
hedge fund as one client.151 Combining this interpretation of Rule
203(b)(3)-1 with the limits of § 12 of the Exchange Act and Rule 12g1 allowed hedge fund advisers to have fourteen funds with 499
investors in each, totaling 6,986 investors. 152
Using its rulemaking authority under the Advisers Act,153 in
December 2004, the SEC issued a final rule to require hedge fund

145.
Goldstein v. Sec. & Exch. Comm'n, 451 F.3d 873, 879 n.5 (D.C. Cir. 2006).
146.
See Definition of "Client" of an Investment Adviser, 17 C.F.R.
§ 275.203(b)(3)-1 (2006) (defining "client" of an investment adviser for purposes of the
Investment Advisers Act).
147.
See Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 12, 15 U.S.C. § 78 (2006) (providing
registration requirements for securities).
148.
17 C.F.R. § 240.12g-1 (2011).
149.
See 17 C.F.R. § 275.203(b)(3)-1(a)(2)(i) (2011) (defining a single client for
purposes of § 203(b)(3) as a limited partnership to which investment advice is provided
based on the objectives of the limited partnership rather than the individual objectives
of the limited partners).
150.
Registration Under-the Advisers Act of Certain Hedge Fund Advisers, 69
Fed. Reg. 72,054, 72,055 n.10 (Dec. 10, 2004) (codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 275 & 279).
151.
See Goldstein v. Sec. & Exch. Comm'n, 451 F.3d. 873, 876 (D.C. Cir. 2006)
("[T]he Commission had interpreted this provision to refer to the partnership or entity
itself as the adviser's 'client."').
152.
Registration Under the Advisers Act of Certain Hedge Fund Advisers, 69
Fed. Reg. at 72,065 n.134.
153.
Investment Advisers Act of 1940 § 211(a), 15 U.S.C. § 80b-11(a) (2006).
Section 211(a) asserts that the Commission may adopt rules "necessary or appropriate
to the exercise of the functions and powers conferred upon the Commission elsewhere
in this subchapter" and "may classify persons and matters within its jurisdiction and
prescribe different requirements for different classes of persons or matters." Id.; see
also id. § 80b-2(a)(17) ("The Commission may by rules and regulations classify, for the
purposes of any portion or portions of this subchapter, persons, including employees
controlled by an investment adviser.").
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advisers to register under the Advisers Act. 154 The rule was
eventually issued by a three-to-two vote155 and then overturned by
the D.C. Circuit in 2006.156 In an attempt to justify its rulemaking,
the SEC cited the necessity to prevent losses caused by hedge fund
advisers' fraud. 5 7 The SEC also pointed to the retailization of the
hedge fund sector,15 8 the growth of the hedge fund industry, "the
broadening exposure of investors to hedge fund risk, and the growing
number of instances of malfeasance by hedge fund advisers."15 9
Furthermore, the SEC considered the increased risks to small
investors caused by the decrease in minimum investment
requirementsl 60 and the additional dangers associated with this
phenomenon.161 The SEC emphasized that it was "sensitive" to the
costs and benefits of a registration requirement for hedge funds.162
To further justify its rulemaking, the SEC cited benefits to mutual
fund investors, other investors and markets, regulatory policy, and
hedge fund advisers.1 63 The benefits to hedge fund investors included
the deterrence of fraud and curtailment of losses, the provision of
basic information about hedge fund advisers, and improved
compliance controls.1 64 Commissioners Cynthia A. Glassman and
Paul S. Atkins opposed releasing the final rule.' 6 5

154.
See Registration Under the Advisers Act of Certain Hedge Fund Advisers,
69 Fed. Reg. at 72,054 (adopting a new rule and rule amendments that require
advisers of certain private investment pools to register with the SEC pursuant to the
Advisers Act).
155.
For the history of U.S. hedge fund regulation before Goldstein, see WULF A.
KAAL, HEDGE FUND REGULATION BY BANKING SUPERVISION: A COMPARATIVE
INSTITUTIONAL ANALYSIS 177-98 (2005).
156.
Goldstein, 451 F.3d at 883-84.
157.
See Registration Under the Advisers Act of Certain Hedge Fund Advisers,
69 Fed. Reg. at 72,078 ("Registration allows us to conduct examinations of hedge fund
advisers, and our examinations provide a strong deterrent to advisers' fraud, identify
practices that may harm investors, and lead to earlier discovery of fraud that does
occur.").
Alas, the SEC never quantified or attempted to prove, or at least show
158.
evidence of, the phenomenon of retailization. For a discussion of the phenomenon of
"retailization," see Kaal, supra note 6.
159.
See Registration Under the Advisers Act of Certain Hedge Fund Advisers,
69 Fed. Reg. at 72,059 (justifying the need for SEC action requiring hedge funds to
register pursuant to the Advisers Act).
See U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM'N [SEC], IMPLICATIONS OF THE GROWTH OF
160.
HEDGE FUNDS 81 (2003) ("We have observed that the minimum qualifications required
to invest in some hedge funds has decreased as newer entrants into the alternative
investments market compete for investors.").
See Registration Under the Advisers Act of Certain Hedge Fund Advisers,
161.
69 Fed. Reg. at 72,057-58 (noting several reasons for broader exposure to hedge funds
in the investing public, including by investors who were previously too risk averse).
162.
Id. at 72,078.
163.
Id. at 72,078-80.
164.
See id. at 72,078 (listing benefits that include a strong deterrent to
advisers' fraud, identification of practices that may harm investors, earlier discovery of
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As noted above, in Goldstein v. SEC, the D.C. Circuit struck
down the hedge fund rule as an instance of arbitrary rulemaking by
the SEC. 166 The court underscored the substantive limits of agency
rulemaking power and rejected the SEC's position that it had
authority to determine the meaning of the term "client" where the
term had not otherwise been defined in the Advisers Act. 167 Many
advisers who had previously registered under the rule decided to
deregister. 16 8 Reacting to Goldstein, the SEC dramatically expanded
fraud protection for investors 169 and proposed to increase the
"accredited investor" standards under Regulation D.17 0
b)

Dodd-Frank Hedge Fund Rules

Hedge funds have been accused of taking excessive risks that
contributed to the financial collapse of 2008.171 Under the Advisers
Act, private advisers were exempt from registration if they had fewer
than fifteen clients and did not hold themselves out to the public as

existing fraud, the ability to screen individuals seeking to advise hedge funds, and to
deny entry to those with a history of disciplinary problems).
Id. at 72,089. Despite an emphasis by the majority on the risks of
165.
retailization, the dissenting commissioners pointed to the 2003 Staff Report, which
found that retailization was not an issue and argued that the inflow of funds is already
so rapid that hedge fund advisers had more to invest than they could handle and were
in no need to solicit retail investors. See SEC, supra note 160, at 80 ("[T]he staff has
not uncovered evidence of significant numbers of retail investors investing directly into
hedge funds.").
See Goldstein v. Sec. & Exch. Comm'n, 451 F.3d 873, 884 (D.C. Cir. 2006).
166.
[T]he Hedge Fund Rule only exacerbates whatever problems one might perceive
in Congress's method for determining who to regulate. The Commission's rule
creates a situation in which funds with one hundred or fewer investors are
exempt from the more demanding Investment Company Act, but those with
fifteen or more investors trigger registration under the Advisers Act. This is an
arbitrary rule.
Id.
167.
Id. at 880-83.
See Alison S. Fraser, Note, The SEC's Ineffective Move Toward Greater
168.
Regulation of Offshore Hedge Funds: The Failure of the Hedge Fund Registration
Requirement, 92 CORNELL L. REV. 795, 798-99 (2007) (noting that once Goldstein
overruled the Hedge Fund Rule, over one hundred hedge funds deregistered with the
SEC).
See Prohibition of Fraud by Advisers to Certain Pooled Investment
169.
Vehicles; Accredited Investors in Certain Private Investment Vehicles, 72 Fed. Reg.
400 (proposed Dec. 27, 2006) (proposing a new rule to allow the SEC to bring
enforcement actions against investment advisers who defraud investors or prospective
investors of hedge funds).
170.
Id. at 405.
155 CONG. REC. H14441-42 (daily ed. Dec. 9, 2009) (statement of Rep.
171.
Sheila Jackson-Lee).
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investment advisers. 172 The Dodd-Frank Act amends the Advisers
Act by establishing rules and regulations for the registration of
private funds with the SEC. 173 Title IV of Dodd-Frank is entitled
the Private Fund Investment Advisers Registration Act of 2010
(PFIARA).1 74 The purpose of the Title IV amendments is to provide
greater protection to investors by expanding the reporting
requirements of private advisers to the SEC.'75 Recognizing that
there are those who operate in the "shadows of our markets,"
apparently a reference to hedge funds generally, the Act mandates
hedge fund adviser registration to increase record keeping and
disclosure.176
The extensive reforms promulgated under the Dodd-Frank Act
represent Congress's attempt to secure markets and to protect
consumers and investors.' 7 7 Representatives supporting the new
hedge fund rules maintained that years without regulation ushered
in the financial crisis. 178 Legislators opposed to the new regulations
argued that hedge funds played no role in the crisis, were irrelevant
to the financial system as a whole, and did not create systemic
risk. 7 9
They alleged that the SEC should have been able to
sufficiently curtail hedge funds under the existing rules but failed to
do so. 1 8 0 Furthermore, some legislators were concerned that the
exemptions in Title IV would render the regulation of hedge funds
ineffective.' 8 '

172.
Investment Advisers Act of 1940 § 203, 15 U.S.C. § 80b-3 (2006).
Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection (Dodd-Frank)
173.
Act §§ 402, 408, Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376, 1570, 1575 (2010) (to be codified
as amended in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.).
174.
Id. § 401, 124 Stat. at 1570.
156 CONG. REC. H5196 (daily ed. June 29, 2010) (Joint Explanatory
175.
Statement of Title IV, Regulation of Advisers to Hedge Funds and Others, by the
House and Senate Conference Committee).
155 CONG. REc. H14420 (daily ed. Dec. 9, 2009) (statement of Rep. Paul
176.
Kanjorski).
177.
Id. at H14418 (statement of Rep. Henry Waxman).
178.
Id. at H14413 (statement of Rep. Barney Frank); id. at H14418 (statement
of Rep. Henry Waxman).
179.
See 156 CONG. REC. S5876 (daily ed. July 15, 2010) (statement of Sen.
Richard Shelby).
[Tihe bill gives the Securities Exchange Commission . .. a new systemic risk
mandate to oversee advisers to hedge funds and private funds. Yet no one
contends private funds were a cause of the recent crisis or that the demise of
any private fund during the crisis resulted in a systemwide shock.
Id.
180.
Id.
181.
See 156 CONG. REC. H5235-39 (daily ed. June 30, 2010) (statement of Rep.
Paul Kanjorski) (outlining concerns with several of the exemptions).
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(1) Disclosure Requirements
Title IV requires registered advisers to maintain records and any
other information that may be necessary and appropriate to avoid
systemic risk. 182 Accordingly, investment advisers have to provide
Risk-related
confidential reports related to systemic risk. 8 3
information includes trading and investment positions; trading
practices; the amount of assets under management; the use of
leverage, including off-balance sheet leverage; counterparty credit
risk exposures; valuation policies; and side letters.184 Dodd-Frank
also requires investment advisers to adopt a written code of ethics
that complies with federal securities law.18 5 Furthermore, each
registered investment adviser must establish, maintain, and enforce
written policies to prevent insider trading.186 Additionally, registered
investment advisers are required to maintain financial and other
business-related books and records, which facilitates inspections by
the SEC.' 8 7 PFIARA provides a one-year transition period before the
registration requirements take effect.' 88
(2) Hedge Fund Registration Exemptions
Recognizing that some entities operating in the markets pose
fewer risks than others, the PFIARA exempts private fund advisers
with less than $150 million AUM,1 89 venture capital fund advisers,19 0
and advisers with less than $100 million AUM who provide advice to
clients on investments other than private funds.' 9 ' It also provides
Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection (Dodd-Frank)
182.
Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, §§ 404, 405, 124 Stat. 1376, 1571-74 (2010) (to be codified as
amended in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.).
Id. § 404, 124 Stat. at 1571-74.
183.
184.
Id.
Id. § 725, 124 Stat. at 1687.
185.
186.
See id. § 404, 124 Stat. at 1571-73 (requiring covered investment advisers
to make disclosures to the SEC to protect investors and the "integrity of the markets").
187.
Id.
See id. § 419, 124 Stat. at 1580.
188.
Except as otherwise provided in this title, this title and the amendments made
by this title shall become effective 1 year after the date of enactment of this
Act, except that any investment adviser may, at the discretion of the
investment adviser, register with the Commission under the Investment
Advisers Act of 1940 during that 1-year period, subject to the rules of the
Commission.
Id.
189.
190.
191.

Id.
Id.
Id.

§ 408, 124
§ 407, 124
§ 410, 124

Stat. at 1575.
Stat. at 1574-75.
Stat. at 1576-77.
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an exemption for foreign private advisers with fewer than fifteen
clients and investors in the United States. 19 2 The exemption for
foreign private advisers requires that the adviser has no place of
business in the United States, has less than $25 million AUM
attributed solely to U.S. clients and investors, and does not hold itself
out to the U.S. public as an investment adviser. 9 3 Although the
exempt entities are not per se required to register, PFIARA mandates
those advisers with less than $150 million AUM to maintain records
and provide the SEC with annual reports or any other reports that
94
the SEC deems appropriate or necessary to protect investors.1
Although the registration requirement seems to silence some of
the hedge fund industry's critics, some of the exemptions are already
under scrutiny. The exemption for venture capital fund advisers
Moreover, a number of international
could raise concerns.1 95
substantial operations in the United
conduct
institutions
financial
96
their operations to meet U.S.
structured
have
and
States'
regulatory requirements in reliance on SEC no-action letters to Uniao

de Bancos de BrasileirosS.A. (Unibanco)'97 and its progeny,' 98 under

which a U.S. subsidiary and a non-U.S. parent are separate entities
for the purpose of the registration requirements under U.S. securities
law. Prior to the enactment of Title IV, the policies expressed in
Unibanco and its successors provided foreign financial institutions
with substantial value in terms of cost and minimization of
The removal of the private adviser
regulatory burdens.199

192.
Id. §§ 402-403, 124 Stat. at 1570-71.
Id. The PFIARA specifies that the SEC may exercise its rulemaking powers
193.
and raise this amount. Id. § 402(a), 124 Stat. at 1571.
Id. § 408, 124 Stat. at 1575.
194.
See 156 CONG. REc. S5915 (daily ed. Jul. 15, 2010) (statement of Sen. Jack
195.
Reed) (expressing concern for the "carve-outs" in the Dodd-Frank bill for venture
capital).
See Rule Comment from Katten Muchin Rosenman LLP on File No. DF
196.
Title IV Exemption, to SEC (Sept. 14, 2010) (asking the SEC to clarify the exemption
for foreign private advisers, because Katten Muchin Roseman had a lot of clients in
that category and has previously relied on the Unibancostandard).
Uniao de Banco de Brasileiros S.A., SEC No-Action Letter, 1992 SEC No197.
Act. LEXIS 817 (July 28, 1992).
See, e.g., Royal Bank of Canada et al., SEC No-Action Letter, 1998 SEC No198.
Act. LEXIS 620 (June 3, 1998) (following the Unibanco approach of treating U.S.
subsidiaries and non-U.S. parent financial institutions separately for purposes of
registration under U.S. securities law); ABN AMRO Bank N.V. et al., SEC No-Action
Letter, 1997 SEC No-Act. LEXIS 754 (July 1, 1997) (same); Murray Johnstone
Holdings Limited et al., SEC No-Action Letter, 1994 SEC No-Act. LEXIS 734 (Oct. 7,
1994) (same); Kleinwort Benson Investment Management Limited et al., SEC NoAction Letter, 1993 SEC No-Act. LEXIS 1181 (Dec. 15, 1993) (same); Mercury Asset
Management PLC, SEC No-Action Letter, 1993 SEC No-Act. LEXIS 652 (Apr. 6, 1993)
(same).
See supra notes 197-98 for a discussion of a softer regulatory burden on
199.
foreign financial institutions.
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exemption 20 0 makes reliance on Unibanco and its progeny less certain
for international financial institutions. More specifically, the foreign
private adviser exemption in Title IV has only very limited
application, 201 and it is unclear if international financial institutions
can still rely on Unibanco and its progeny. This may create
substantial uncertainty, curtailing the activities of international
financial institutions in the United States. Timely clarification by the
SEC as to the continuance of its policies expressed in Unibanco could
minimize the impact on U.S. markets.
PFIARA authorizes the SEC to promulgate rules pertaining to
exempt entities. 202 Given the SEC's concerns during the legislative
process and its rulemaking authority in the context of hedge fund
registration exemptions,2 03 there is a chance that the limited
exemptions under PFIARA could be further curtailed. PFIARA
requires the SEC to examine factors such as the "size, governance,
and investment strategy of an adviser" to determine the systemic risk
a fund may create and impose registration and examination
procedures accordingly. 204 Legislators feared that by including even
limited exemptions in hedge fund regulation, the exemptions could
effectively "swallow the rules."2 05 Accordingly, the Dodd-Frank Act
empowers the SEC to utilize its rulemaking authority to prevent this
outcome. 206 The legislators supporting the Dodd-Frank Act wanted
the SEC to be able to obtain the basic information necessary to
prevent fraud, protect against systemic risk, and provide investors
with useful information about the funds-even funds that are exempt

See Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection (Dodd200.
Frank) Act § 403, Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376, 1571 (2010) (to be codified as
amended in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.) (removing the private adviser exemption
from the Advisers Act).
See id. §§ 402-403, 124 Stat. at 1570-71 (laying out the specifics of the
201.
foreign private adviser exemption).
202.
Id. § 408, 124 Stat. at 1575.
See 156 CONG. REC. S5915 (daily ed. Jul. 15, 2010) (statement of Sen. Jack
203.
Reed) (noting the importance of bringing hedge funds within the "umbrella of financial
regulation").
204.
See Dodd-Frank Act § 408, 124 Stat. at 1575.
In prescribing regulations to carry out the requirements of this section with
respect to investment advisers acting as investment advisers to mid-sized
private funds, the Commission shall take into account the size, governance, and
investment strategy of such funds to determine whether they pose systemic
risk, and shall provide for registration and examination procedures with
respect to the investment advisers of such funds which reflect the level of
systemic risk posed by such funds.
Id.
205.
156 CONG. REC. H5238 (daily ed. Jun. 30, 2010) (statement of Rep. Paul
Kanjorski).
206.
Id.
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from registration.2 0 7 Others question whether regulators would have
the resources to promulgate and enforce rules that can protect
against systemic risk. 208 If regulators lack the resources to protect
against systemic risk, hedge fund regulation could be futile.
(3)

De Minimis Hedge Fund Investment Exemption

Title VI allows banks to make or retain a de minimis investment
in private equity or hedge funds. 209 Under this exception, banks can
invest up to 3 percent of Tier 1 capital in hedge and private equity
funds, 210 provided that such investments are less than 3 percent of
the total ownership interests of the funds. 211 The exception was not
included in the first drafts of the bill,21 2 and the exact language was
not incorporated until the May 20, 2010, draft. 213
Banks have several years to structure their activities to comply
with the de minimis rule. 214 This may make the de minimis revision
of the Volcker Rule workable.2 15 The revised rule may also protect
against bailouts, and it prohibits banks from guaranteeing or
insuring the performance of any sponsored private equity or hedge
fund.2 16 Although the de minimis exception restricts banking entities
with regard to hedge funds, it may not affect traditional banking. 217
Both supporters and those opposed to the de minimis exception and

See 156 CONG. REC. S5912 (daily ed. Jul. 15, 2010) (statement of Sen.
207.
Patrick Leahy) (supporting the Dodd-Frank bill because, among other things, it
requires hedge funds to register with the SEC).
208.
See id. at S5875-78 (statement of Sen. Richard Shelby) (criticizing the
Dodd-Frank bill's reliance on massive bureaucracy and questioning the effectiveness of
such a scheme at reducing systemic risk).
209.
Dodd-Frank Act § 619(d)(4), 124 Stat. at 1627.
See 156 CONG. REC. S5889 (daily ed. July 15, 2010) (statement of Sen. Kay
210.
Hagan) ("The section's limitations on financial organizations that own a depository
institution from investing or sponsoring in hedge funds or investments in private
equity to 3 percent of an organization's assets, in the aggregate, references 'tier 1
capital."').
211.
Id.
Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2009, H.R. 4173, 111th
212.
Cong. (2009).
213.
Restoring American Financial Stability Act of 2010, H.R. 4173, 111th Cong.
§ 617 (as amended in the Senate May 20, 2010).
214.
See Dodd-Frank Act § 619(c), 124 Stat. at 1622-23 (providing that § 619
takes effect either a year after final rules are issued or two years after the law is
enacted, whichever is earlier).
215.
See 156 CONG. REc. S5889 (daily ed. July 15, 2010) (statement of Sen. Kay
Hagan) (praising the fact that § 619 gives banking entities several years to conform
with the new rule).
216.
Id. (citing Dodd-Frank Act § 619(d)(1)(G)(v), 124 Stat. at 1625).
217.
See id. ("I am pleased that as part of the conference report that the Volcker
language was modified to permit a banking entity to engage in a certain level of
traditional asset management business, including the ability to sponsor and offer
hedge and private equity funds.").
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other provisions of the Dodd-Frank Act agree that it will be crucial
for the SEC to define the rules and implement the provisions in a way
that protects the functioning of the market.2 18 It is unclear if the
SEC and other regulators are equipped to handle this task. 219
(4) Revision of Accredited Investor Standards
Before the enactment of PFIARA, hedge fund regulation in the
United States was largely based on exemptions for hedge fund
advisers 220 and compliance with accredited investor standards. 221 As
long as hedge funds did not advertise or otherwise hold themselves
out to the public, limited the resale of their securities, and curtailed
the sale of their securities to only a limited number of wealthy
investors, they were exempt from U.S. securities law. 222 To ensure
that they were exempt from registration and supervision, hedge funds
generally complied with these requirements and limited the sale of
their securities to sophisticated and wealthy investors. 2 23 Prior to the
changes in PFIARA, Regulation D provided a safe harbor under § 4(2)
of the Securities Act and defined an "accredited investor" as a person
with a net worth of more than $1 million. 224 The SEC noted that
inflation might have eroded the significance of a $1 million net worth
as a proxy for investor sophistication, and it proposed to amend
Regulation D. 225 Determining what level of wealth acts as an
effective proxy of "sophistication" of investors remains difficult.
218.
See 156 CONG. REC. S5906, 5913 (daily ed. July 15, 2010) (statements of
Sen. Evan Bayh & Sen. Jack Reed) (noting the importance of regulating the financial
industry in a way that does not impede market functions).
See id. at S5875-78 (statement of Sen. Richard Shelby) (noting that this is
219.
giving the SEC a new mandate to oversee, where it failed to carry out its existing
mandates in the past). But see id. at S5899 (statement of Sen. Carl Levin) ("We believe
the SEC has sufficient authority to define the contours of the rule in such a way as to
remove the vast majority of conflicts of interest from these transactions, while also
protecting the healthy functioning of our capital markets.").
See Investment Advisers Act of 1940 § 203(b), 15 U.S.C. § 80b-3(b) (2006)
220.
(providing broader registration requirement exemptions for hedge fund advisers than
the Dodd-Frank Act).
See SEC Regulation D-Rules Governing the Limited Offer and Sale of
221.
Securities Without Registration Under the Securities Act of 1933, 17 C.F.R. § 230.501
(2011) (providing rules for hedge funds).
Houman B. Shadab, Fending for Themselves: Creating a U.S. Hedge Fund
222.
Market for Retail Investors, 11 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL'Y 251, 285-90 (2008).
Id. at 289-90. But see id. at 309-18 (arguing normatively for the
223.
establishment of a hedge fund market for retail investors).
R. 506, SEC Regulation D, 17 C.F.R. § 230.501(a)(5).
224.
See SEC Proposed Rules, 72 Fed. Reg. 405-08 (proposed Jan. 4, 2007) (to be
225.
codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 230) (proposing a two-step approach to determine whether an
individual is an accredited investor: (1) whether the individual meets the test in Rule
501(a) or Rule 215, and (2) whether the individual owns at least $2.5 million in
investments).
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Prior to the enactment of PFIARA, U.S. hedge fund regulation
was based on the idea that investors who met the Regulation D
criteria qualified to invest in hedge funds because they could "fend for
themselves." 226 Regulation D defined the term "accredited investor"
as a natural person whose individual net worth (or joint net worth
with such person's spouse) exceeded $1 million at the time of the
purchase, 227 or whose individual income exceeded $200,000 (or joint
income with the person's spouse exceeded $300,000) in each of the
two most recent years, and who had a reasonable expectation of
reaching the same income level in the year of investment. 228 After its
attempt to require hedge fund registration and its subsequent defeat
in the D.C. Circuit's Goldstein decision,2 29 the SEC, in December
2006, dramatically expanded fraud protection for investors. 23 0 At the
same time, it proposed to increase the accredited investor standards
under Regulation D231 by adding a requirement of ownership of at
least $2.5 million in investments 232 to the net worth or income test
specified in Rule 501(a) 233 and Rule 215.234 The SEC's reasoning that
"natural persons may have indirect exposure to private pools" 235 and
"many individual investors today may be eligible to make
investments in privately offered investment pools as accredited
investors that previously may not have qualified as such for those
investments" 236 seems to suggest that the retailization of the hedge
fund industry was a major concern. 23 7

See Sec. & Exch. Comm'n v. Ralston Purina Co., 346 U.S. 119, 125 (1953)
226.
(reasoning that based on the purpose of exemptions in the Securities Act, exempt
transactions are for those who have no need for protection of the act because they are
able to "fend for themselves").
17 C.F.R. § 230.501(a)(5).
227.
228.
Id. § 230.501(a)(6).
See Goldstein v. Sec. & Exch. Comm'n, 451 F.3d. 873, 883-84 (D.C. Cir.
229.
2006) (striking down SEC rule requiring that hedge fund investors be counted as
clients of the fund's adviser for purposes of the fewer than fifteen clients exemption).
230.
See SEC Proposed Rules, 72 Fed. Reg. 400 (proposed Jan. 4, 2007) (to be
codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 275) (explaining provisions of the proposed rule allowing the
SEC to bring enforcement actions against investment advisers who defraud investors
or prospective investors).
Id. at 405.
231.
Id. at 414 (clarifying that in addition to other Regulation D requirements,
232.
an accredited investor must own not less than $2.5 million in investments, after
inflation adjustment).
233.
Id. at 416.
234.
Id. at 414.
235.
Id. at 404.
236.
Id.
237.
Id. at 405.
As proposed, the term accredited natural person would include any natural
person who meets the requirements specified in the current definition of
accredited person, as that term relates to natural persons, and would add a
requirement that such person also must own (individually, or jointly with the
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Preempting the SEC proposal, PFIARA revised the definition of
"accredited investor" in Regulation D by excluding the value of a
natural person's primary residence for purposes of determining
whether the person meets the $1 million net worth standard. 238
PFIARA has a one-year transition rule. 239 However, the SEC staff
indicated that this revision will take immediate effect. 240
c)

Impact Assessment of Hedge Fund Rules Under Dodd-Frank

Almost all hedge fund advisers complied with the private adviser
exemption 241 in order to avoid registration as an investment adviser
under federal rules. 242 Without exemptions, hedge fund advisers
were subject to SEC inspections, books and record keeping

person's spouse) not less than $2.5 million (as adjusted every five years for
inflation) in investments at the time of purchase of securities issued by private
investment vehicles under Regulation D or section 4(6).
Id.
238.
Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection (Dodd-Frank)
Act § 413, Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376, 1577 (2010) (to be codified as amended
in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.). To the contrary, the definition promulgated by the
SEC to define "accredited investor" in the Securities Act of 1933 did not include the
exclusion of the person's primary residence in determining that person's net worth. 17
C.F.R. § 230.215 (2011).
Dodd-Frank Act § 419, 124 Stat. at 1580.
239.
ScoTT J. LEDERMAN, HEDGE FUND REGULATION § 4:2, at 4-7 (2010) (stating
240.
that the change went into immediate effect).
See Investment Advisers Act of 1940 § 203(b), 15 U.S.C. § 80b-3(b) (2006)
241.
(providing more generous registration requirement exemptions for hedge fund advisers
than the Dodd-Frank Act).
Kaal, supra note 6, at 32 n.172.
242.
It is unclear what role investment adviser registration with the SEC plays in
the current environment. Some of the data made available to the author by
Robert E. Place of the SEC's Investment Management Division highlights the
importance of Goldstein v. Sec. & Exch. Comm'n, 451 F.3d 873 (D.C. Cir. 2006):
11,292 investment advisers are registered with the Commission with total
AUM of $43 trillion. 1,845 or 16 percent of these advisers are identified by
Form ADV as hedge fund advisers. 790 hedge fund advisers have registered
since January 1, 2005 (and are still registered). 217 of these advisers have
registered since the Goldstein decision (June 23, 2006). 169 hedge fund
advisers are located outside the U.S. 11,710 private investment funds ("PIF')
identified; (10,029 PIFs once duplicate names are removed). $3 trillion in
private investment fund assets identified; ($2.6 trillion in PIF assets once
duplicate names are removed). 753 or 30 percent of the HF advisers that were
identified on June 23, 2006, either withdrew their registration or had their
registration cancelled. 382 or 15 percent of the HF advisers that were identified
on June 23, 2006, have been reclassified as non hedge fund advisers because of
changes they made to their Form ADV.
Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
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requirements, 243 disclosure requirements, 24 4 and code of ethics
requirements. 245 Additionally, advisers incurred significantly higher
legal fees. PFIARA replaced the private adviser exemption with a
general requirement that an investment adviser to any hedge fund or
private equity fund must register with the SEC. 24 6 Investment
24 7
advisers who previously relied on the private adviser exemption
and are required to register with the SEC must register by July 21,
2011.248 PFLARA exempts private fund advisers with less than $150
million AUIM, 249 venture capital fund advisers,25 0 and advisers with
less than $100 million AUM who provide advice to clients on
investments other than private funds. 25 1 PFIARA also provides an
exemption for foreign private advisers with fewer than fifteen clients
and investors in the United States. 252 Some of the exemptions have
already raised concerns.2 5 3
If exempted private fund advisers with less than $150 million
AUIM254 have not previously registered under state law because they
complied with federal law and were registered with the SEC, they
may now be required to deregister with the SEC and become subject
to a state registration requirement. 255 The administrative and
compliance cost of deregistering under federal law and reregistering
under state law may be significant and could harm the industry.

17 C.F.R. § 275.204-2 (2011).
243.
Id. § 275.204-3.
244.
Id. § 275.204A-1 (requiring registered investment advisers to "establish,
245.
maintain and enforce a written code of ethics," subject to some minimum requirements
included in the rule).
See Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection (Dodd246.
Frank) Act §§ 403, 408(m), Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376, 1575 (2010) (to be
codified as amended in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.) (eliminating the private adviser
exemption and providing for more stringent registration requirements for hedge funds
and other private investment advisers).
See Investment Advisers Act of 1940 § 203(b), 15 U.S.C. § 80b-3(b) (2006)
247.
(providing more generous registration requirement exemptions for hedge fund advisers
than the Dodd-Frank Act).
See Dodd-Frank Act § 419, 124 Stat. at 1580 (providing that the
248.
registration requirements take effect one year after enactment). The Dodd-Frank Act
was enacted on July 21, 2010. Id. pmbl., 124 Stat. at 1376.
Id. § 408, 124 Stat. at 1575.
249.
Id. § 407, 124 Stat. at 1575.
250.
Id. § 410, 124 Stat. at 1576.
251.
Id. §§ 402-403, 124 Stat. at 1570-71.
252.
See 156 CONG. REc. S5915 (daily ed. July 15, 2010) (statement of Sen. Jack
253.
Reed) ("While I successfully convinced the conferees to drop a carve-out for private
equity advisers, the bill still contains problematic exemptions for venture capital firms
and family offices.").
Dodd-Frank Act § 408, 124 Stat. at 1575.
254.
255.
Rules Implementing Amendments to the Investment Advisers Act of 1940,
75 Fed. Reg. 77,051, 77,054 (Dec. 10, 2010) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 275) ("[Ain
adviser no longer eligible for Commission registration would transition to State
registration.").
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Even advisers that do not have to comply with the federal
registration under this PFIARA exemption will nonetheless be
subject to certain disclosure and recordkeeping requirements to be
defined by the SEC. 2 56
(1) Increased Disclosure Obligations
PFIARA further requires registered advisers to maintain records
and any other information that the SEC and the systemic risk
regulators deem necessary and appropriate. 257 Advisers must
provide confidential reports with respect to certain information
related to systemic risk, 258 such as trading and investment positions;
trading practices; the amount of AUM; the use of leverage, including
off-balance sheet leverage; counterparty credit risk exposures;
valuation policies; side letters; and other information deemed
necessary. 259 Dodd-Frank also requires all hedge funds to be subject
to SEC examinations. 260 PFIARA provides a one-year transition
period before the registration requirements take effect. 261
The SEC may or may not have the resources to evaluate data
involving dynamic hedging strategies and trades. If the SEC were to
attempt to evaluate such data, perhaps in an effort to ensure that
systemic risks are curtailed, its ability to hire additional, wellqualified staff to evaluate such data is unclear. An understanding of
dynamic hedging trades and strategies requires a significant level of
financial sophistication and training, and the task of attracting staff
with such knowledge could place the SEC in competition for talent
with hedge funds and banks. Even if the SEC were to start hiring
math and accountancy majors who otherwise would have good
prospects to work as analysts in the financial services industry, the
setup costs would be significant. Perhaps, if a position as an analyst
with the SEC is perceived as a stepping stone to becoming an analyst
with a major hedge fund or investment bank, qualified candidates
could be incentivized to work for the SEC before starting a career in
finance.

256.
Dodd-Frank Act § 407, 124 Stat. at 1575 ("The Commission shall require
investment advisers exempted by reason of this subsection to maintain such records
and provide to the Commission such annual or other reports as the Commission
determines necessary or appropriate in the public interest or for the protection of
investors."). For a discussion of the impact of the SEC's rulemaking authority, see infra
Part 111.2.c.2.
257.
Dodd-Frank Act § 404(b)(1)(A), 124 Stat. at 1571-72.
258.
Id. § 404(b)(3), 124 Stat. at 1572.
259.
Id. § 404(b)(3)(H), 124 Stat. at 1572.
260.
Id. § 404(b)(6)(A), 124 Stat. at 1573.
261.
Id. § 416, 124 Stat. at 1579.
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By excluding proprietary information of private funds from
public disclosure, Dodd-Frank increased the SEC's authority to
exempt information from the Freedom of Information Act
requirements. 262 Even though the SEC is exempt from disclosing
information it obtains from hedge funds, 263 there is a risk that the
information will not be kept private. Another major concern is
leakage by the regulator, especially leakage of disclosed trading
positions, trading strategies, and dynamic hedging strategies. The
SEC and other regulators who obtain and review proprietary
information could inadvertently pass this information on to third
parties. The confidential nature of this information makes it highly
valuable for third parties who engage in the same markets as the
owner of the proprietary information, and this form of leakage could
undermine trading strategies and the long-term viability of hedge
funds. Leakage of proprietary information by the regulators may be
more of a problem for hedge funds with an established track record.
Start-up funds, however, could also be affected if star traders with
established trading records and successful trading strategies decide
to set up their own fund or funds. Leakage could also affect specific
positions in the market. Front-running and other abusive practices
may be unavoidable if regulators leak information pertaining to
specific and potentially market-moving positions of large private
equity and hedge funds. Even if regulators may have been successful
in "maintaining secrecy regarding sensitive private information,"264
information pertaining to trading strategies and positions held by
hedge funds could have a different quality and heightened sensitivity
than comparable information that was otherwise kept confidential by
regulators.
(2)

SEC's Rulemaking Authority

As discussed above, 265 PFIARA authorizes the SEC to
promulgate rules pertaining to exempt entities. 266 Given concerns
over the SEC's rulemaking authority during the legislative process, 267

262.
263.
264.
265.
266.
267.
Reed).

Id. § 9291, 124 Stat. at 1857-59.
Id.
Romano, supranote 6, at 13.
See supra Part I.b.2.
Dodd-Frank Act § 408, 124 Stat. at 1575.
See 156 CONG. REC. S5915 (daily ed. Jul. 15, 2010) (statement of Sen. Jack

The Dodd-Frank bill also closes a significant gap in financial regulation by
requiring advisers to hedge funds and private equity funds to register with the
Securities and Exchange Commission. Based on legislation that I introduced,
we will for the first time bring advisers to those funds within the umbrella of
financial regulation. This will allow regulators to obtain the basic information
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the limited exemptions under PFIARA could be further curtailed.
PFIARA requires the SEC to examine the "size, governance, and
investment strategy of an adviser" to determine the systemic risk
that these funds create and impose registration and examination
procedures accordingly. 268 Legislators, fearing that the exemptions
would effectively "swallow the rules," 269 empowered the SEC to
utilize its rulemaking to prevent this outcome. 270 The legislators
supporting the Dodd-Frank Act wanted the SEC to be able to obtain
the basic information necessary to prevent fraud, protect against
systemic risk, and provide investors with useful information about
the funds, even funds that are exempt from registration. 27 1 Others
questioned whether the regulators are capable of making this
determination and whether they have the resources to promulgate
and enforce rules that successfully protect against systemic risk.27 2
If the SEC uses its rulemaking authority to continue curtailing
the hedge fund industry, the consequences could be significant for
that industry and financial markets. In particular, the compliance
costs to the hedge fund industry could be substantial. It may be
indicative that all of the hedge funds that were forced to register with
the SEC before Goldstein2 7 3 deregistered upon the D.C. Circuit's
holding that the SEC exceeded its authority by attempting to register

they need to prevent fraud and mitigate systemic risk, while at the same time
providing investors with more information and greater transparency.
Id.
268.

Dodd-Frank Act

§ 408,

124 Stat. at 1575.

In prescribing regulations to carry out the requirements of this section with
respect to investment advisers acting as investment advisers to mid-sized
private funds, the Commission shall take into account the size, governance, and
investment strategy of such funds to determine whether they pose systemic
risk, and shall provide for registration and examination procedures with
respect to the investment advisers of such funds which reflect the level of
systemic risk posed by such funds.
Id.
269.
156 CONG. REC. H5238 (daily ed. June 30, 2010) (statement of Rep. Barney
Frank).
See id. ("[Tihe success of this landmark reform effort will ultimately depend
270.
on the individuals who become the regulators.").
See 156 CoNG. REc. S5902 (daily ed. July 15, 2010) (statement of Sen. John
271.
Kerry) (clarifying that the goal of the Financial Stability Oversight Council should be
to target financial companies, regardless of size, that could pose a risk to the financial
stability of the United States).
See id. at S5875 (statement of Sen. Richard Shelby) (criticizing the Dodd272.
Frank Act for creating an even larger bureaucracy and questioning its ability to make
the correct decisions); id. at 85885 (statement of Sen. Ted Kaufman) (raising the
concern that agencies may not have the resources to properly carry out all of their
obligations under the Dodd-Frank Act).
Goldstein v. Sec. & Exch. Comm'n, 451 F.3d 873 (D.C. Cir. 2006).
273.
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hedge funds. 2 74 Perhaps the SEC would be well advised to interpret
the authority it received from Congress rather than to increase the
requirements on hedge funds to address concerns over potential
systemic risk. There are some indicia that hedge funds may not pose
a systemic risk.2 75 Even assuming that systemic implications arise
from hedge fund investing, systemic risk is such a multifaceted issue
that it could require the involvement of more than one regulator in
one jurisdiction. 276
As such, cooperation among regulators
internationally could help to address systemic concerns. The SEC
alone may not be able to accomplish the task, and its rulemaking
under PFIARA should not impose additional requirements on hedge
funds under the guise of minimizing systemic risk. To the contrary,
the SEC's rulemaking authority has the potential to support the
hedge fund industry. Clarification and guidance on hedge fund rules
under PFIARA would be tremendously valuable to the investing
community.
Many open issues exist under PFIARA, and any
guidance by the SEC would give market participants more confidence
in the rules and their meaning and interpretation. Moreover, this
guidance may minimize transaction and compliance costs, reduce
uncertainty, and facilitate market participants' efficient operation.
(3)

Blue Sky Laws

PFIARA provides that an investment adviser who gives
investment advice to clients other than private funds (e.g., an adviser
with separate accounts) is not subject to federal registration. 277 This
exemption applies if the adviser has less than $100 million AUM and
would be required to comply with state registration rules and register
with the state in which it maintains its principal office and place of
business. 278 If advisers who are not obligated to register with the
SEC are required, under state law, to register with fifteen or more
states, Dodd-Frank allows them to register with the SEC under
federal law.2 79 Under PFIARA, however, the SEC has authority to

274.
Fraser, supranote 168, at 798-99.
275.
See infra Part V.
276.
Matthew Beville, Dino Falaschetti & Michael J. Orlando, An Information
Market Proposalfor MeasuringSystemic Risk, 12 U. PA. L. REV. 849, 873-74 (averring
that systemic risk is difficult to measure because the information required is "widely
dispersed," the very definition of systemic risk is unclear, and political pressure may
influence objectivity).
277.
Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection (Dodd-Frank)
Act § 410(2)(A), Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376, 1576 (2010) (to be codified as
amended in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.).
278.
Id.
Id. ("[I]f by effect of this paragraph an investment adviser would be
279.
required to register with 15 or more States, then the adviser may register under
section 203.").
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define certain disclosure and recordkeeping requirements that will
apply to advisers who are exempt from federal registration. 280
It may be presumed from the PFIARA exemption for advisers
with less than $100 million AUM that state law de minimis
exemptions do not apply.2 8 ' Attorneys advising hedge fund start-ups,
however, often use state law de minimis exemptions to minimize
costs to their clients and help them raise funds without registering
with the SEC. 282 In contrast, registering with the SEC and filing
Form ADV involves substantial administrative attention for the fund
adviser, and attorney's fees can be substantial.28 3 The number of
start-ups and smaller hedge fund operations has not been formally
determined, but it cannot be underestimated. Hedge fund managers
have incentives to bring investors into the hedge fund as soon as
possible to facilitate a new hedge fund's timely and efficient
operation. Keeping the number of investors below fifteen is vital in
this process. 284 Even though a "client" under the Advisers Act can
include legal entities, 285 hedge fund managers would probably want
to make sure, especially in the start-up phase of a fund, that they
maximize the counting of potential clients that would be excluded
from the fifteen-client limit under federal law. Such clients could be
retail investors who could qualify to invest under state-specific de
minimis exemptions.
Under de minimis exemptions in state Blue Sky laws, there
could be several scenarios allowing retail investors to invest in hedge
funds and hedge fund-like vehicles. 28 6 Hedge fund managers may
consider bringing retail investors into a hedge fund under such
exemptions. If the hedge fund manager wants to bring U.S. investors
into the fund and the respective investors are residents of certain
states, the fund manager would have to register as an investment
adviser under the respective state laws if the state does not have a de
minimis exemption that exempts the manager from registration.2 87

280.
Id. § 408, 124 Stat. at 1575 (giving the SEC authority to require even
exempted advisers to keep records and make reports as it deems necessary).
281.
Rules Implementing Amendments to the Investment Advisers Act of 1940,
75 Fed. Reg. 77,052, 77,054 (Dec. 10, 2010) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 275).
282.
Kaal, supra note 6, at 613 ("Under de minimis exemptions in state Blue
Sky laws, there could be several scenarios in which retail investors would be able to
invest in hedge funds and hedge-fund-like-vehicles.").
283.
Id. at 613-14.
284.
Id. at 613.
17 C.F.R. § 275.203(b)(3)-1(a)(2) (2011).
285.
See Kaal, supranote 6, at 611-17 (Chapter on CFTC rules and Blue Sky de
286.
minimis exemptions).
Most large states, however, do have de minimis exceptions. See, e.g., CAL.
287.
CORP. CODE § 25202(a) (2005); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 36b-6e (2007); ILL. ADMIN. CODE tit.
14, § 130.805 (2006); MAsS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 110A, § 401(m)(1)(G) (2002); N.J. STAT.
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Such registration under state law would require filing a Form ADV,
used by the SEC to federally register certain investment advisers,
with the appropriate state through the Investment Adviser
Registration Depository.28 8 Using Form ADV may result in
significant transaction costs. Especially in the start-up phase of a
hedge fund, the manager may want to avoid such costs. Managers
also want to avoid concerns over the eligibility of investors.
Additionally, managers want to use existing investors in the fund as
a form of advertising to bring in additional investors, to establish a
track record, and to facilitate efficient operations in a timely fashion.
Accordingly, especially in the start-up phase of a hedge fund,
managers may consider certain state de minimis investment adviser
registration exemptions for investors an attractive alternative to
complying with federal laws.28 9
(4)

Cost of Compliance

Before PFIARA, without the private adviser exemption,
investment advisers were subject to SEC inspections, books and
record keeping requirements, 290 disclosure requirements,29 1 code of
ethics requirements,2 92 and consequently, significantly higher legal
Scholars and industry representatives argued that these
fees.
requirements increased the cost of doing business for the hedge fund
294
industry. 293 PFIARA requires investor registration with the SEC,
and voided the private adviser exemption while creating other
Nevertheless, investment advisers will have to
exemptions.29 5
For instance,
comply with a litany of PFIARA requirements.
investment advisers that are required to register under federal law
must register with the SEC using Form ADV. 296 The cost of

ANN. § 49:3-56(g) (2001); N.Y. GEN. BUS. LAWS § 359-eee (2007); 7 TEX. ADMIN. CODE
§ 7:116.1(b)(2)(C) (2008).
See generally Form ADV, SEC, http://www.sec.gov/answers/formadv.htm
288.
(last visited Feb. 28, 2011).
See statutes cited supra note 287.
289.
17 C.F.R. § 275.204-2.
290.
291.
Id. § 275.204-3.
Id. § 275.204A-1 (requiring registered investment advisers to "establish,
292.
maintain and enforce a written code of ethics," subject to some minimum requirements
included in the rule).
Jacob Preiserowicz, Note, The New Regulatory Regime for Hedge Funds:
293.
Has the SEC Gone Down the Wrong Path?, 11 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 807, 842
(2006) (arguing that the repercussions of regulating hedge funds include increased
administrative and legal costs).
See registration discussion supraPart III.2.a.
294.
295.
Id.
296.
Form ADV, supra note 288.
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complying with the requirements of Form ADV, including attorney's
fees, can be substantial.2 97
In part as a reaction to the Madoff scandal, PFIARA requires
registered investment advisers that have "custody"298 of client
accounts to keep all client assets with a qualified custodian. 299
Investment advisers also have to provide detailed statements of what
assets are held by whom.30 0 Additionally, advisers must obtain an
annual surprise verification of client assets by independent
accountants if their funds do not obtain audited financials complying
with Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP) and
distribute them promptly to investors.3 0 1 Moreover, PFIARA requires
investment advisers to adopt written policies and procedures to
prevent and detect violations of federal securities law.30 2 The cost of
compliance with these requirements could be significant, and the
The
efficiency of this provision may be called into question.
to
prevent
and
implementation of written policies and procedures
detect violations of federal securities law implies that potential
violations of securities law are -foreseeable. But because securities
law has been substantially changed under the Dodd-Frank Act, the
foreseeability of potential violations could be further curtailed.
Investment advisers must also appoint a Chief Compliance
Officer.3 03 To ensure compliance with ethical business standards,
Dodd-Frank mandates the adoption of a written code of ethics that
complies with federal securities law. 304 In particular, this code must

297.
See Verret, supra note 6, at 807 (noting that filing a Form ADV generally
requires hiring an attorney to serve as a compliance officer at a salary of $125,000 to
$500,000 per year).
298.
"Investment adviser" is defined broadly under the Advisers Act to cover
virtually all private fund managers. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer
Protection (Dodd-Frank) Act § 411, Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376, 1577 (2010)
(amending 15 U.S.C. 80b-1 et seq. by adding at the end the following, "An investment
adviser registered under this title shall take such steps to safeguard client assets over
which such adviser has custody, including, without limitation, verification of such
assets by an independent public accountant, as the Commission may, by rule,
prescribe."); see also Materials Submitted by Nora M. Jordan, Davis Polk & Wardwell,
in PRAC. L. INST., GLOBAL CAPITAL MARKETS & THE U.S. SECURITIES LAWS 2010:
STRATEGIES FOR THE CHANGING REGULATORY ENVIRONMENT 629, 640 (2010) (arguing

that based on the SEC's failure to discover Madoffs Ponzi scheme, the investment
adviser risk ratings should be based on information compiled by all SEC divisions).
299.
Dodd-Frank Act § 411, 124 Stat. at 1577.
Id.
300.
Id. § 404, 124 Stat. at 1571.
301.
Id. § 409(b), 124 Stat. at 1575-76 (to be codified as amended at 15 U.S.C.
302.
§ 80b-2).
Id. § 753, 124 Stat. at 1750. PFIARA, however, does not require that the
303.
Chief Compliance Officer be an employee of the firm. Advisers can outsource this
function, but they must conduct and document an annual review to show the
effectiveness of its compliance program. Id. § 725, 125 Stat. at 1685.
Id. § 725(b)(3)(A)(ii), 124 Stat. at 1687.
304.
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set forth standards governing personal securities trading by the
adviser's personnel.3 0 5
Reinforcing insider-trading monitoring,
PFIARA requires each registered adviser to establish, maintain, and
enforce written policies to prevent insider trading. 306 In part to
facilitate SEC inspections, registered investment advisers are
required to maintain a long list of financial and other businessrelated books and records.30 7 It is unclear whether the SEC will
actually be able to evaluate all of the data that PFIARA requires
advisers to disclose upon inspection.3 08 The SEC's ability to evaluate
this data depends to some degree on its budget. However, as
discussed above,3 09 even with additional funding, the SEC may not
have the resources to hire sufficiently qualified staff to evaluate such
data.
(5)

De Minimis Investment Exemption

The Dodd-Frank Act allows banks to make or retain a de
minimis investment in hedge funds or private equity funds3 10 if such
investments constitute less than 3 percent of the total ownership
interests of the funds. 3 11 Although the de minimis exemption will
provide restrictions on the hedge fund exposure of banking entities, it
may not affect traditional banking. 312 This limitation may support
breaking the connection between a bank's balance sheet and its risk
taking in the market.31 3
At the same time, the de minimis
amendment may have reduced the impact of the Volcker Rule, which
attempts to limit the ability of U.S. banks to make investments for
their own accounts rather than on behalf of their customers. 314 The
revised version of the Volcker Rule could be workable, however,
because it gives banks several years to bring their activities within
compliance.3 15 The 3 percent de minimis exception will require the
SEC to closely monitor banks to prevent abuse. 316 Although there
may be a risk that banks continue to own and manage large hedge

305.
Id. The ethics code also has to require covered personnel to pre-clear
purchases in IPOs and private placements and to report personal securities holdings
and transactions periodically. Id.
306.
Id. § 404, 124 Stat. at 1571.
307.
Id.
308.
In the context of enhanced disclosure requirements, see supraPart III.2.c.1.
309.
See supra Part III.2.c.1
310.
Dodd-Frank Act § 619, 124 Stat. at 1620.
311.
Id.
312.
156 CONG. REC. S5870, S5889-90 (daily ed. July 15, 2010) (statement of
Sen. Kay Hagan).
313.
Id. at S5894-99 (statement of Sen. Jeff Merkley).
314.
Id. at S5884-87 (statement of Sen. Ted Kaufman).
315.
Id. at S5889-90 (statement of Sen. Kay Hagan).
316.
Id.
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funds,31 7 the revised rule prohibits a bank from guaranteeing or
insuring the performance of any sponsored hedge or private equity
fund.3 18 The failure of a bank-managed hedge fund could increase
the financial risk to the bank substantially and could result in a
bailout,3 19 which Dodd-Frank prohibits. 320 It is unclear, however, if
the prohibition against bailouts will be enforced if it has systemic
dimensions. 32 1 Dodd-Frank also imposes restrictions on banks acting
as investment advisers to hedge funds, and these restrictions could
impact the use of de minimis investments in hedge funds. 322
Ultimately, the regulators will be tasked with defining the rules and
implementing the provisions in a way that protects the functioning of
the market. 323 It is unclear if the regulators are equipped to handle
this task.324
d)

Revision of Accredited Investor Standards

PFIARA revises the accredited investor standards set forth in
Under PFIARA, an "accredited
the Securities Act of 1933.325
investor" is defined as an investor with an individual net worth of $1
million, exclusive of the value of the individual's primary
residence, 326 and the SEC has rulemaking authority to review this
definition and modify it to protect investors. 327 Current orthodoxy

Id.
317.
Id. (citing Dodd-Frank Wall Street and Consumer Protection (Dodd-Frank)
318.
Act §619(d)(1)(G)(v), Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376, 1620 (2010) (amending the
Bank Holding Company Act of 1856, 12 U.S.C. § 1841 et seq. (2006), by adding a new
section, 12 U.S.C. § 1851(d)(4)(G))).
Id. at S5884-87 (statement of Sen. Ted Kaufman).
319.
Dodd-Frank Act § 619, 124 Stat. at 1624-25.
320.
156 CONG. REC. S5884-87 (daily ed. July 15, 2010) (statement of Sen. Ted
321.
Kaufman).
Id. at S5897 (statement of Sen. Jeff Merkley) (commenting specifically on
322.
the criteria required under § 619, including restrictions on firms bailing out the funds).
Id. at S5889 (statement of Sen. Carl Levin).
323.
Id. at S5876 (statement of Sen. Richard Shelby) (noting that this is giving
324.
the SEC a new mandate to oversee, where it failed to carry out its existing mandates in
the past); id. at S5899 (statement of Sen. Carl Levin) ("We believe that the SEC has
sufficient authority to define the contours of the rule in such a way as to remove the
vast majority of conflicts of interest from these transactions, while also protecting the
healthy functioning of our capital markets.").
Dodd-Frank Act § 413, 124 Stat. at 1577.
325.
326.
Id. ("[A]ny net worth standard shall be $1,000,000, excluding the value of
the primary residence of such natural person."); see 17 C.F.R. § 230.215 (2010)
(providing the general rule promulgated by the SEC to define "accredited investor" in
the Securities Act of 1933, which did not include the exclusion of the person's primary
residence in determining that person's net worth).
327.
Dodd-Frank Act § 413, 124 Stat. at 1577.
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suggests that the SEC may use this authority to merely increase the
numerical wealth requirement or to react to market movements that
affect the great majority of Americans and impact their qualification
as hedge fund investors. Alternatively, the SEC could implement
investor suitability measures. 32 8
As noted earlier,32 9 the traditional system of hedge fund
regulation used the wealth of investors as a proxy for their
sophistication: if an investor qualified as "sophisticated" based on a
wealth threshold, the investor was "qualified" to invest in hedge
funds.3 30 The numerical wealth requirements currently in place to
define qualified investors do not, however, take into account that
even investors who fulfill the numerical wealth requirements do not
always have the adequate level of knowledge, understanding, and
sophistication required to invest in highly complex financial
For instance, some retirement funds of large
instruments.3 3 1
companies are member managed, 332 and it is possible that the
members of a certain trade (firemen, policemen, etc.) will manage
their own retirement fund. These members may not have significant
investing experience or a background in finance. In fact, they may
never have been involved in investing and were appointed by chance,
upon retirement, or at some other point in their careers, to manage
the fund. Nevertheless, under existing securities law, they would be
deemed "sophisticated" and, therefore "qualified" to invest in hedge
funds.3 33 Although the SEC has previously proposed to toughen the
numerical wealth requirements for hedge funds, 334 such attempts
have failed to ascertain the appropriate level of sophistication and
adequate understanding of highly complex financial instruments.
Congress's decision to exclude the value of an individual's
primary residence in the definition of "accredited investor" under

The Commission may undertake a review of the definition of the term 'accredited
investor' . . . excluding the requirement relating to the net worth standard
described in subsection (a), should be adjusted or modified for the protection of
investors, in the public interest, and in light of the economy.
Id.
329. See generally Kaal, supra note 6 (discussing the shortcomings of accredited
investor standards and the benefits of investor suitability standards).
329.
See supra Part III.2.b.4
330.
See discussion supra Part III.2.b.4.
331.
Kaal, supranote 6.
332.
Debra A. Davis, Do-It Yourself Retirement: Allowing Employees to Direct the
Investment of their Retirement Savings, 8 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 353, 375-76 (2006)
("[MIany employers allow participants to direct the investment of their retirement plan
accounts.").
17 C.F.R. § 230.215 (2010).
333.
See discussion in the context of Regulation D supra Part III.2.b.4
334.
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PFIARA 335 takes into account inflationary trends that enabled
individuals to qualify for hedge fund investments even though they
barely matched the numerical wealth requirement.
Given the
significant devaluation of home equity in the United States in 2009
and 2010,336 however, Congress should have further increased the
numerical wealth requirement for hedge fund investments. More
importantly, the general policy of qualifying investors by using
wealth as a proxy for sophistication seems questionable.3 3 7 The
policy fails to take into account investors who technically fulfill the
numerical wealth requirements but lack an adequate level of
financial sophistication. Using investor suitability measures could be
a preferable approach.3 38

3. Impact Assessment of Asymmetric Regulation in Dodd-Frank
and the AIFM Directive
Eighty-five percent of all hedge fund AUM are located in U.S.
The AIFM Directive applies to U.K.and U.K. jurisdictions.3 3 9
registered hedge funds, and Dodd-Frank applies to U.S.-registered
hedge funds. Although U.S. and EU hedge funds operate in the same
markets and follow similar strategies in those markets, they are
Despite several
subjected to different regulatory schemes.
exemptions, Dodd-Frank requires hedge fund advisers to register
with the SEC if their AUM exceed $150 million. 34 0 Given this
threshold, the U.S. registration requirement under Dodd-Frank does
not correspond with the registration requirement under the AIFM

335.
Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection (Dodd-Frank)
Act § 413, Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376, 1577 ("[A]ny net worth standard shall
be $1,000,000, excluding the value of the primary residence of such natural person.");
see 17 C.F.R. § 230.215 (2010) (providing the general rule promulgated by the SEC to
define "accredited investor" in the Securities Act of 1933; the definition did not include
the exclusion of the person's primary residence in determining that person's net worth);
discussion supra Part II.2.b.4.
336.
William C. Dudley, President, Fed. Reserve Bank of N.Y., Lecture, in 15
FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 357, 369 (2010) (noting that, because of the length and
severity of the recession, home equity has "dried up").
337.
Kaal, supra note 6, at 612-13.
338.
Id. at 635-36 (showing that existing FINRA investor suitability standards
could be a model for reform).
339.
HEDGE FUND WORKING GRP., HEDGE FUND STANDARDS: FINAL REPORT 3
(2008), http://www.efinancialnews.com/share/medialdownloads/2008/01/2449616462.pdf.
See supra note 57.
340.
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Directive, which currently necessitates registration if a fund's AUM
exceed £100 million. 341 Other dissimilarities between the provisions
of Dodd-Frank and the AIFM Directive include the EU-wide passport
regime, 342 limitations on compensation structure of European
AIFMs, 343 fiduciary duties for AIFMs, 344 and limits on the amount of
leverage AIFMs can use.345

November 11 Directive, supra note 4, ch. I, art. 2a(2)(a). Under the prior
341.
draft version of the AIFM Directive, the registration requirement was triggered if a
hedge fund had AUM in excess of £250 million. Commission AIF Proposal,supra note
4, at 28.
342.
November 11 Directive, supra note 4, ch. VII, art. 35a; see discussion on
effects of passport regime supra Part III. Lb. Upon registration with the SEC, private
fund advisers in the United States do not have to comply with burdensome and costly
passport regime requirements to do business in other U.S. states.
343.
November 11 Directive, supra note 4, Annex II. Under the AIFM Directive,
AIFMs' remuneration structure, including limitations on overall compensation and
bonuses, may be substantially aligned with that of bankers, as AIFMs' pay will be
subject to the Capital Requirements Directive. The Dodd-Frank gives the SEC the
authority to determine if rules are necessary to prohibit certain compensation schemes
for investment advisers. Dodd-Frank Act § 913 (g)(1) (2).
344.
November 11 Directive, supra note 4, at ch. III, sec. 1 art. 9(1). AIFMs acting
on behalf of AIFs and managing AIFs must act in the best interest of the ALIFs. In the
United States, § 913(g) of the Dodd-Frank Act authorizes the SEC to establish a
fiduciary duty for brokers and dealers:
(g) AUTHORITY TO ESTABLISH A FIDUCIARY DUTY FOR BROKERS
AND DEALERS.(1) SECURITIES EXCHANGE ACT OF 1934.-Section 15 of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (15 U.S.C. 78o) is amended by adding at
the end the following:
"(k) STANDARD OF CONDUCT."(1) IN GENERAL.-Notwithstanding any other provision of this
Act or the Investment Advisers Act of 1940, the Commission may
promulgate rules to provide that, with respect to a broker or dealer, when
providing personalized investment advice about securities to a retail
customer (and such other customers as the Commission may by rule
provide), the standard of conduct for such broker or dealer with respect to
such customer shall be the same as the standard of conduct applicable to an
investment adviser under section 211 of the Investment Advisers Act of
1940. The receipt of compensation based on commission or other standard
compensation for the sale of securities shall not, in and of itself, be
considered a violation of such standard applied to a broker or dealer.
Nothing in this section shall require a broker or dealer or registered
representative to have a continuing duty of care or loyalty to the customer
after providing personalized investment advice about securities.
Dodd-Frank Act § 913(g), 124 Stat. at 1828; see Wall Street Fraud and Fiduciary
Duties: Can Jail Time Serve as an Adequate Deterrent for Willful Violations?: Hearing
on S.3217 Before the Subcomm. on Crime and Drugs of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary,
111th Cong. 1 (2010) (statement of John C. Coffee, Jr., Adolf A. Berle Professor of Law
Columbia Univ. Law Sch.) (supporting the imposition of a fiduciary duty on investment
bankers and brokers but noting that the SEC could carve out safe harbors and
exemptions to prevent the provisions from being overbroad). But cf. id. at 24
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The asymmetry of hedge fund regulation could have larger
implications. Asymmetric regulation of entities operating in the
same markets creates legal uncertainty and significant transaction
costs. 346 If hedge fund managers are subjected to stricter rules in one
jurisdiction while competing for clients and profit margins with funds
in jurisdictions that impose less restrictive rules, they could be at a
comparative disadvantage. It remains to be seen what mechanisms
European hedge fund managers develop to cope with the new
regulations. Increased costs are likely to be passed on to clients.
The drafters of PFIARA, the AIFM Directive, and other recent
direct and indirect regulatory measures aimed at hedge fundS347
assume that hedge funds played a role in the financial crisis.
However, the role of hedge funds in the financial crisis has not been
systematically studied or evaluated. After the collapse of Long-Term
Capital Management (LTC1VI) in 1998, most dealer-banks required
full collateralization of hedge fund transactions, 34 8 and consequently
hedge funds have been less levered than banks for quite some time. 349
Furthermore, the collapse of large hedge funds like Amaranth in
2006350 and large redemptions by investors during and after the
crisis3 51 did not cause systemic problems.352 Because hedge funds

(statement of Larry E. Ribstein, Mildred Van Voorhis Jones Chair, Univ. of Ill. Coll. of
Law) (stating that fiduciary duties are the "wrong tool" for dealing with investment
banking because applying fiduciary duties to investment bankers would potentially
punish conduct that is legitimate); Larry E. Ribstein, Are PartnersFiduciaries?,2005
U. ILL. L. REV. 209, 232 (2005) (discussing the problems of imposing fiduciary duties
outside a conventional fiduciary relationship and suggesting that fiduciary duties are
only appropriate in a "narrow class of cases").
345.
November 11 Directive, supra note 4, ch. III, sec. 1 art. 25(7). Moreover,
member states of the European Union can impose limits on leverage in emergency
situations. Id. ch. III, sec. 1 art. 25(3). Under the Dodd-Frank Act, investment advisers
must report their use of leverage, including the amount of off-balance sheet leverage.
However, the Dodd-Frank Act does not specify that the SEC may promulgate rules
limiting investment advisers' use of leverage. Dodd-Frank Act § 404, 124 Stat. at
1571-74.
Wagner, supra note 140, at 1.
346.
See discussion supraPart III.A.1-2.
347.
Too Big to Swallow, supra note 20 (noting that, after the failure of LTCM
348.
hedge funds, there was flight to traditional banking).
See Faten Sabry & Thomas Schopflocher, The Subprime Meltdown: Not
349.
Again!, AM. BANKR. INST. J., Sept. 2007, at 41 (noting that investors became averse to
risky securities following the failure of LTCM); Too Big to Swallow, supra note 20.
350.
See Buttonwood: Paint it Black, supra note 22 ("[Tlraders repeatedly get
caught out by 'unprecedented' market movements. The collapse of two hedge funds,
Long-Term Capital Management in 1998 and Amaranth Advisors in 2006, were cases
in point.").
351.
Zuckerman & Davis, supra note 23, at C2 ("If rival traders believe a firm
will have to sell positions to meet investor redemptions, they can sell those investments
ahead of time, increasing the pressure. Some traders made those moves last fall when
it emerged that hedge fund Amaranth Advisors LLC was having problems.").
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have fewer assets and less leverage than banks, they are less likely to
cause the next crisis. Without the threat of systemic risk, the
purpose of direct hedge fund regulation is unclear.

IV. BASEL III
The Basel Accords' focus on regulation of bank capital is a
relatively recent phenomenon. Basel III, the new capital proposal of
the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, was announced on
September 12, 2010, and is widely anticipated to be adopted.35 3 All
twenty-seven member countries have signed on to the new
principles.35 4 In an attempt to prevent a recurrence of the recent
financial crisis, Basel III introduces new worldwide liquidity and
leverage standards.3 5 5
Basel III, which will apply to all G-20
banks,356 will regulate and alter credit standards of banks and impact
hedge funds' level of leverage.3 5 7 In its current version, Basel III

Annette L. Nazareth, SEC Comm'r, Remarks Before the PLI Hedge Fund
352.
Conference (June 6, 2007), available at http://edgar.sec.gov/news/speechl2007/spchO6O
607aln.htm ("In September 2006, the hedge fund Amaranth lost over $6 billion. Despite
the astounding size and speed of the losses to Amaranth and its unfortunate investors,
there were no significant effects on the markets from a systemic risk point of view.").
REPORT TO
Contra U.S. GOv'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO/GGD-00-3,
CONGRESSIONAL REQUESTERS, LONG-TERM CAPITAL MANAGEMENT: REGULATORS NEED
To Focus GREATER ATTENTION ON SYSTEMIC RISK 10 (1999), http://www.gao.gov/
new.items/ggO0003.pdf ("The LTCM crisis demonstrated that lapses in market
discipline can create potential systemic risk.").
353.
The G-10 Governors and Heads of Supervision (GHOS) announced their
agreement on a new capital proposal on September 12, 2010. U.S. Supports G10 Basel
Agreement, NEWSROOM BULL., Sept. 12, 2010, http://newsroom-magazine.com/2010/
internationallus-supports-gl0-basel-agreement.
The U.S. federal banking agencies support the agreement reached at the
September 12, 2010, meeting of the G-10 Governors and Heads of Supervision
(GHOS). This action, in combination with the agreement reached at the July
26, 2010, meeting of GHOS, sets the stage for key regulatory changes to
strengthen the capital and liquidity of internationally active banking
organizations in the United States and around the world.
Id. The G-20 nations are likely to adopt Basel III. Huw Jones, Basel Committee Says
Agrees Bank Buffer Strategy, REUTERS, July 16, 2010, http://www.reuters.com/article/
idUSTRE66F11K20100716 (noting Basel III on track for approval in November 2010).
354.
Brooke Masters, Basel Breakthrough in Drive to Tighten Rules on Global
Banking, FIN. TIMES, July 27, 2010, at 1.
355.
BIS, supra note 37, at 11.
356.
Id. at 17 n.16 (noting that Basel III, like Basel II, will apply not only to all
G-20 banks, but consolidated banking groups as well).
357.
Id. at 5.
The Committee is introducing a leverage ratio requirement as well as the
following proposal: Going forward, banks must determine their capital
requirement for counterparty credit risk using stressed inputs. This will
address concerns about capital charges becoming too low during periods of
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would not directly apply to hedge funds.3 58 However, many entities,
including hedge funds, engage in financial transactions that are the
functional equivalent of banking activities. Basel III has been
criticized for not applying to this "shadow banking system."35 9 As
such, Basel III or similar requirements may, in the not too distant
future, be extended to non-bank entities, such as hedge funds, that
engage in banking activities. 3 60
1. The Evolution of the Basel Accords
Prior to the enactment of the first Basel Accord in 1988, banking
regulation focused on interest rates, market structure, and asset
allocation rules. 361 In an attempt to address a market environment
that was changing because of financial and technological
innovation, 362 the Basel Committee, in its 1988 Accord, introduced
minimum capital requirements for banks.36 3 The Accord required a

compressed market volatility and help address procyclicality. The approach,
which is similar to what has been introduced for market risk, will also promote
more integrated management of market and counterparty credit risk.
Id.
358.
See generally id.
See generally Adrian Blundell-Wignall & Paul Atkinson, Thinking Beyond
359.
Basel III: Necessary Solutions for Capital and Liquidity, 2010 OECD J.: FIN. MARKET
TRENDS 13-14 (2010), http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/42/58/45314422.pdf (averring that
an issue with Basel III is that it does not address "shadow banking" and that if
regulation is increased, the "shadow banking" will shift or be reduced).
STANDARD & POOR'S GLOBAL CREDIT PORTAL: RATINGSDIRECT, BASEL III
360.
PROPOSAL TO INCREASE CAPITAL REQUIREMENTS FOR COUNTERPARTY CREDIT RISK MAY

SIGNIFICANTLY AFFECT DERIVATIVES TRADING (2010), http://www.bis.org/publIbcbsl65/
spccr.pdf ("We believe that banking groups with significant trading activities and a
high proportion of financial intermediaries as counterparties (such as hedge funds)
would likely be the most affected by the implementation of this proposal."). Some
believe that a number of, if not all, G-20 countries will extend Basel III or similar
requirements to other types of financial entities that engage in bank-like activities. In
the United States, for example, such requirements could be extended to systemically
important financial institutions and to insurance companies. Id.; see generally 156
CONG. REC. S5894 (daily ed. July 15, 2010) (statement of Sen. Jeff Merkley) (noting
that Dodd-Frank creates a mechanism via the Financial Stability Oversight Council by
which U.S. nonbank financial companies would be subject to heightened standards).
Robert F. Weber, New Governance,FinancialRegulation, and Challenges to
361.
Legitimacy: The Example of Internal Models Approach to CapitalAdequacy Regulation,
62 ADMIN. L. REV. 783, 799 (2010) (noting that prior to the first Basel Accord banks
were regulated by measuring the risk exposure of the bank's total assets).
Aldo Caliari, Assessing Global Regulatory Impacts of the U.S. Subprime
362.
Mortgage Meltdown: InternationalBanking Supervision and the Regulation of Credit
Rating Agencies, 19 TRANSNAT'L L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 145, 193 (2010) (stating that
the Basel Accord was intended to improve risk evaluation where conditions had
undergone rapid changes and advances in financial techniques).
Pierre-Hughes Verdier, Transnational Regulatory Networks and Their
363.
Limits, 34 YALE J. INT'L L. 113, 132 (2009) (averring that the 1988 Basel Accord's most
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capital charge of 8 percent of a loan for ordinary credit risk, 364 4
percent for credit risks on loans to other banks or mortgage loans, 365
and 0 percent for loans to sovereign debtors. 366 In 1993, in an
attempt to regulate market risk, the Basel Committee introduced
rigid capital ratios, its "standard approach." 367
The capital ratios in the Basel Committee's standard approach
were vehemently criticized as reactionary by the banking industry. 36 8
The banks claimed that, through the use of quantitative models with
a substantial empirical foundation, they had already achieved a level
of risk management that was more finely attuned to actual risk than
the capital ratios of the standard approach. 36 9 The Basel Committee
reacted to this criticism and introduced the 1996 Amendment to the
Capital Accord to Incorporate Market Risks.3 70 The Amendment
allowed banks to sideline the standard approach and determine
37
regulatory capital by using their own risk calibration models. '
Finally, in 2000, Basel II allowed banks to use their own risk models
Thereafter, the Basel
to determine credit and market risks.3 72
Committee modified the Basel II Accord to improve risk calibration of
capital requirements.

significant achievement was setting regulatory capital requirements for banks that
were active on an international level).
INTERNATIONAL
SUPERVISION,
ON BANKING
BIS, BASEL COMM.
364.
44 (1988),
CONVERGENCE OF CAPITAL MEASUREMENT AND CAPITAL STANDARDS
http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs04a.pdf ("[T]he Committee confirms that the target
standard ratio of capital to weighted risk assets should be set at 8% (of which the core
capital element will be at least 4%).").
Id.
365.
Id.
366.
Nicholas Dorn, The Governance of Securities, 50 BRIT. J. CRIMINOLOGY 23,
367.
32-33 (2010).
[I]n 1993, the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision consulted on a
standard approach to bank capital requirements, [and] the banking industry
responded with intensive criticism, arguing that such regulation would
represent a step back from the very sophisticated risk management procedures
that they themselves had started to implement on the basis of quantitative
models. The banks won and their 'model-based' approach was codified in 1996.
Id.
Walter I. Conroy, Risk-Based Capital Adequacy Guidelines: A Sound
368.
Regulatory Policy or a Symptom of Regulatory Inadequacy?, 63 FORDHAM L. REV. 2395,
2418 n.160 (1995) (noting that the capital ratios were arbitrary and "seat of the pants
stuff' (quoting Peter Cooke, a Bank of England official who chaired the BIS Committee
on Banking Supervision)).
Dorn, supranote 367, at 32-33.
369.
Id. at 33.
370.
BIS, BASEL COMM. ON BANKING SUPERVISION, BASEL II: INTERNATIONAL
371.
CONVERGENCE OF CAPITAL MEASUREMENT AND CAPITAL STANDARDS: A REVISED
18 (2004), http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs107.pdf; see also BIS, supra note
FRAMEWORK
37, at 12.
BIS, supra note 37, at 12.
372.
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2. The Basel Approach Revised
The Bank of International Settlement and the Basel Committee
face significant criticism over Basel III.373 Some countries would
have preferred a more comprehensive proposal. 374 Others sought a
much more expedited implementation schedule.3 7 5
Still others
proposed requirements, such as Tier 1 leverage requirements, lossabsorbing capacity of systemically important banks, and liquidity
ratios, that were not initially adopted as part of Basel III but will be
studied and could be introduced later.3 76
U.S. regulators are
supportive of the Basel III effort,37 7 but they prefer higher
standards,3 78 especially measures to deal with the "too big to fail"
problem.37 9 EU regulators are equally supportive of the Basel III
rules, but they would prefer adjusting the definition of capital,3 80
leverage limits, 38 ' and liquidity rules.38 2

373.
Peter Miu et al., Can Basel III Work? Examining the New Capital Stability
Rules by the Basel Committee-A Theoretical and Empirical Study of Capital Buffers
(Feb. 20, 2010) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1556
446 (expressing concern that Basel III has several shortcomings, which will result in
numerous unintended consequences).
374.
Id. (noting further that Basel III should focus more on developing better
risk and capital management processes, and maintaining higher quality capital).
375.
Kenneth W. Dam, The Subprime Crisis and Financial Regulation:
Internationaland ComparativePerspectives, 10 CHI. J. INT'L L. 581, 628 (2010) (opining
that Basel III implementation will be time consuming).
376.
Danforth Townley, Davis Polk & Wardwell, L.L.P., Summary of the DoddFrank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Passed by the House of
Representatives on June 30, 2010, in PRAC. L. INST., HEDGE FUNDS 2010: STRATEGIES
AND STRUCTURES FOR AN EVOLVING MIIARKETPLACE 49, 105 (2010) (asserting that the

current draft of Basel III excludes hybrid capital in Tier 1, though in the United States
hybrid capital is sometimes permitted to be held in Tier 1 capital, subject to
quantitative limits and restrictions).
377.
Press Release, Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., U.S. Banking
Agencies Express Support for Basel Agreement (Sept. 12, 2010), available at
http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/press/bcreg/20100912a.htm
(opining that
the Basel III agreement is "a significant step forward in reducing the incidence and
severity of future financial crises, providing for a more stable banking system that is
less prone to excessive risk-taking, and better able to absorb losses while continuing to
perform its essential function of providing credit to creditworthy households and
businesses").
378.
Id. (opining that the Dodd-Frank Act "requires the establishment of more
stringent prudential standards including higher capital and liquidity requirements for
large, interconnected financial institutions").
379.
380.

Id.
PHILIP HARLE ET AL., BASEL III: WHAT THE DRAFT PROPOSALS MIGHT MEAN

FOR EUROPEAN BANKING 1 (2010), http://ec.europa.eulinternal market/bank/docs/gebil
mckinsey-en.pdf (estimating that the effect of the current changes in capital ratios and
leverage ratios in the proposals would result in significant capital shortfalls).
381.
Id.
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Most U.S. investment banks and European banks endorsed and
and are, consequently, mostly highly
implemented Basel II"
leveraged.3 84 U.S. banks that implemented Basel II or a hybrid of
Basel I and II may not have performed as well as competitors who did
not implement either of the Basel Accords.3 85 Critics point out that
the international harmonization of banking regulation through the
Basel Accords could have led a majority of large banks to follow
financial strategies similar to those that eventually led to the
financial crisis of 2008-2009.386 Prompted by the Basel Accords,
similar financial strategies could have influenced the selection of
assets and investments, and their securitization could have resulted
in the use of similar risk models.38 7 It is possible that the implicit

Id. (expressing concern that the new liquidity rules will severely affect
382.
funding and European banks would have to raise up to C5.5 trillion in additional
capital).
David Zaring, International Law and the Economic Crisis: International
383.
InstitutionalPerformance in Crisis, 10 CHI. J. INT'L L. 475, 483 (2010) (noting that big
U.S. and European banks were capitalized under the standards of Basel II, and
specifically pointing out that the Basel committee set the standard followed by Bear
Stearns and Lehman Brothers, which clearly was inefficient in keeping these banks
solvent).
Herald Benink & George Kaufman, Turmoil Reveals the Inadequacy of
384.
Basel II, FIN. TIMES, Feb. 27, 2008 (contending that the wide implementation of Basel
II coincided with the massive losses reported by big banks and suggesting that Basel II
"creates perverse incentives to underestimate credit risk"); cf. Pierre-Hughes Verdier,
Recent Books on InternationalLaw, 104 AM. J. INT'L L. 338, 340 (reviewing DANIEL K.
TARULLO, BANKING ON BASEL: THE FUTURE OF INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL REGULATION

(2008)) (asserting however, that while most large U.S. banks implemented Basel II, the
banks resisted safeguards proposed by the banking agencies to protect against
significant capital declines, which led to prolonged struggles among banking
regulators, Congress, and the banks); Franceso Cannata & Mario Quagliariello, The
Role of Basel II in the Subprime FinancialCrisis: Guilty or Not Guilty 15 (Centre for
Applied Res. in Fin. Working Paper Group, Working Paper No. 3/09, 2009), available at
the
on
(proposing,
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=1330417
contrary, that while Basel II was a component of banks' supervision, it alone cannot be
blamed for the excessive risk taking and high leveraging of banks during the financial
crisis because other supervisory components also had weaknesses).
Cf. Zaring, supra note 383, at 483 (suggesting that Basel II played a role in
385.
the demise of America's "big five investment banks," thus calling into question the
usefulness of the Basel Accord).
386.
Id.
Cf. Michael S. Barr & Geoffrey P. Miller, Global Administrative Law: The
387.
View from Basel, 17 EUR. J. INT'L L. 15, 21-22 (2006) (noting that Basel was intended
to create international harmonization and was introduced specifically to reduce
systemic risk from bank failures and to limit externalities that may lead to a lack of
information sharing; and asserting that Basel has succeeded "in providing global public
goods of information"); Stavros Gadinis, The Politics of Competition in International
Financial Regulation, 49 HARV. INT'L L.J. 447, 506 (2008) (asserting further that
implementation of the Basel Accords has required uniformity in risk investment
techniques and information technology, making it difficult for smaller banks to
comply); Salman Banaei, Global Governance of Financial Systems: The International
Regulation of Systemic Risk, 35 DENV. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 547, 552-53 (2007) (reviewing
KERN
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harmonization of bank lending practices was, therefore, not restricted
to one nation.
Consequently, critics of Basel argue that
harmonization of lending practices did not minimize systemic risk
but, paradoxically, increased it.3 88 The Basel Accords allegedly
produce globally similar business and regulatory strategies.3 8 9 As a
result of harmonization, mistaken policies can result in global
Therefore, greater harmonization of
financial distress.3 90
international banking regulation via Basel III is unlikely to lead to
better outcomes and may well exacerbate future crises.3 91
3. The Core Rules in Basel III
Central to the new rules is an attempt to prevent banks from
using off-balance sheet vehicles and risk-weighing methods to hide
the true size of their balance sheet. 392 At the same time, the Basel
Committee simplified certain core definitions. Basel III establishes
the following three measures for capital: Tier 1 Capital (6 percent),
Common Equity (4.5 percent), and Total Capital (8 percent).39 3 The

INTERNATIONAL REGULATION OF SYSTEMIC RISK (2006)) (averring that the first and

third pillars of Basel II promoted "dangerous homogeneity").
388.
Cf. Banaei, supra note 387, at 550-51 (asserting that the substantive rules
set forth by the Basel Accords do not limit systemic risk because they do not address
the banking needs of less developed nations, and because Basel has an "imbalanced
decision making structure").
The debates surrounding the adoption of the Accord reveal that, even when
faced with a collective action problem that requires cooperation to reduce
systemic risk and improve global financial stability, national regulators take
positions that reflect the interests of domestic constituencies. As a result, the
adoption of common standards will require solving distributive problems where
the interests of these constituencies diverge.
Verdier, supra note 363, at 142; cf. also Barr & Miller, supra note 387, at 21
(suggesting further that harmonization reduces flexibility, resulting in slower
regulatory change and blocking regulatory competition).
389.
Cf. Barr & Miller, supra note 387, at 20 (noting that the Basel Accords
could be viewed as "regulatory imperialism," developing rules affecting nations that
have no role in the development process).
390.
Verdier, supra note 384, at 358 (suggesting that the current global financial
crisis is due in large part to harmonized capital standards implemented through the
Basel Accord).
391.
Contra We Need a Basel III for a New Order: Soros, ECoN. TIMES, Apr. 11,
2008, http://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/economy/indicators/We-need-a-BaselIII-for-a-new-order-Soros/articleshow2942920.cms (arguing that Basel II must be
reworked to overcome the serious financial crisis).
See BIS, supra note 37, at 65-66 (providing a table with a summary of the
392.
proposed new rules).
Press Release, Bank for Int'l Settlements, Group of Governors and Heads of
393.
Supervision Announces Higher Global Minimum Capital Standards (Sept. 12, 2010),
http://www.bis.org/press/pl00912.pdf [hereinafter BIS Press Release].
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total capital ratio will remain at the current required level of 8
percent. 394 The new principles would require banks to limit Tier 1
Capital,3 95 the only capital that can be counted on to absorb losses, to
3 percent of unweighted assets. 396 At the same time, the Basel
Committee softened its prohibition on counting the equity held by
minority shareholders in overseas subsidiaries toward Tier 1
Capital.3 97 The minimum capital requirement is less onerous than
feared by the banking industry. Furthermore, banks will not have to
publish their ratios until 2015 and will not have to comply with the 3
percent minimum until the end of 2017.398 To avoid a repeat of the
Lehman Brothers collapse, regulators want banks to have enough
liquid assets to survive a thirty-day crisis.39 9 For the liquidity

Under the agreements reached today, the minimum requirement for common
equity, the highest form of loss absorbing capital, will be raised from the
current 2% level, before the application of regulatory adjustments, to 4.5% after
the application of stricter adjustments. This will be phased in by 1 January
2015. The Tier 1 capital requirement, which includes common equity and other
qualifying financial instruments based on stricter criteria, will increase from
4% to 6% over the same period.
Id.
394.
395.

Id. Annex 1.
BIS, supranote 37, at 4.

The Committee therefore is announcing for consultation a series of measures to
raise the quality, consistency, and transparency of the regulatory capital base.
In particular, it is strengthening that component of the Tier 1 capital base
which is fully available to absorb losses on a going concern basis, thus
contributing to a reduction of systemic risk emanating from the banking sector.
Id.
BIS, BASEL COMM. ON BANKING SUPERVISION, CONSULTATIVE DOCUMENT:
396.
PROPOSED ENHANCEMENTS TO THE BASEL II FRAMEWORK 1 80 (2009),
http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbsl50.pdf- see also Miu et al., supra note 373, at 7 ("[T]he
Basel Committee has proposed that a buffer range should be established above the
minimum capital requirements such that, if Tier 1 capital should fall into the buffer
range, [financial institutions] would be constrained in the total amount of discretionary
earnings distributions.").
397.
BIS, supra note 396, at 10.
Pillar 1 capital requirements represent minimum requirements. An
appropriate level of capital under Pillar 2 should exceed the minimum Pillar 1
requirement so that all risks of a bank-both on- and off-balance sheet-are
adequately covered, particularly those related to complex capital market
activities.... While all banks must comply with the minimum capital
requirements during and after such stress events, it is imperative that
systemically important banks have the shock absorption capability to
adequately protect against severe stress events.
Id.
398.
BIS Press Release, supra note 393, at 1-2.
399.
See, e.g., Nout Wellink, President of De Nederlandsche Bank, Remarks at
the
Inst.
of
Int'l
Fin.
2010
Spring
Meeting
(June
11,
2010),
http://www.bis.org/speeches/sp100611.pdf ("Banks must hold a stock of high-quality
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coverage ratio, however, the Basel Committee eased up its definition
of how severe the outflows in a crisis would be and allowed banks to
count corporate bonds of a high quality, in addition to cash and
However, the
government bonds, toward their stockpile. 400
Committee still wants banks to hold more long-term assets to match
long-term liabilities, but it acknowledges that the proposal needs
work and will not be implemented before 2018.401
In addition to the three capital ratios, the Committee requires
that banks hold capital above the regulatory minimum by introducing
capital conservation buffers. 40 2 Conservation buffers are intended as
financial reserves that banks can draw on in times of economic
stress, 40 3 and need to be large enough that they remain above the
minimum in periods of significant sector-wide downturns. 4 04 The
buffers would rise and fall in a countercyclical manner. 405 Capital
conservation buffers consist of about 2.5 percent of common equity
and will be phased in under Basel III at the beginning of 2016.406
Full implementation is expected in 2019, and banks are required to
hold common equity plus a conservation buffer of 7 percent,
amounting to a total capital plus conservation buffer of 10.5
Basel III incentivizes preserving the buffer by
percent. 407
constraining earning distributions if a bank is approaching the
minimum capital ratio requirements. 40 8
Most importantly for the purposes of this Article, in an attempt
to reduce risk to counterparties, 409 the Basel Committee is increasing

liquid assets that is sufficient to allow them to survive a 30-day period of acute
stress.").
400.
BIS, BASEL COMM. ON BANKING SUPERVISION, CONSULTATIVE DOCUMENT:
INTERNATIONAL FRAMEWORK FOR LIQUIDITY RISK MEASUREMENT, STANDARDS, AND
MONITORING 2 (2009), http://www.bis.org/publbcbsl50.pdf (including in the definition
of liquid assets that satisfy various conditions).
401.
BIS Press Release, supra note 393, at 4 ("Existing public sector capital
injections will be grandfathered until 1 January 2018.").
402.
Blundell-Wignall & Atkinson, supra note 359, at 10 ("[T]he Committee is
proposing that banks hold buffers of capital above the regulatory minimum-large
enough that they remain above the minimum in periods of significant sector-wide
downturns.").
403.
BIS Press Release, supra note 393, at 2 ("The purpose of the conservation
buffer is to ensure that banks maintain a buffer of capital that can be used to absorb
losses during periods of financial and economic stress.").
404.
Id.
405.
Blundell-Wignall & Atkinson, supra note 359, at 10.
406.
BIS Press Release, supra note 393, Annex 2 (showing the incremental
increases in capital conservation buffers from 2016 to 2019).
Id.
407.
408.
Id. at 2.
409.
Manmohan Singh & James Aitken, Counterparty Risk, Impact on
Collateral Flows, and Role for Central Counterparties3 (Int'l Monetary Fund, Working
Paper No. WP/09/173, 2009), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?
abstract-id=1457596.
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capital requirements on counterparty risk. 410
This has major
implications for market participants and markets.411 For instance,
"increasing capital requirements on counterparty risk provides a
strong incentive for banks to push more over-the-counter (OTC)
derivatives transactions through qualified clearing houses." 412 In
this context, Dodd-Frank, in Title VII, also puts in place clearing
requirements for all swaps over which either the SEC4 13 or the
Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC) has authority. 414
Each registered swap dealer or major participant will be subject to
minimum capital requirements, 4 15 which are to be set by regulators
who must consider the risks of the types of swaps and the risks of
other activities in which the dealer is engaged.4 16 Dodd-Frank also
gives authority to the CFTC to set margin levels on futures
exchanges. 417 These requirements will subject swap dealers and
major participants to even higher margin and capital requirements
than required by the clearinghouses. 4 18 In setting the requirements,
regulators could infringe on laws in international jurisdictions, and

410.
411.
360, at 6.

BIS, supra note 37, at 1.
STANDARD & POOR'S GLOBAL CREDIT PORTAL: RATINGSDIRECT, supra note

[I]ncreasing capital requirements on counterparty risk provides a strong
incentive for banks to push more OTC derivatives transactions through
qualified clearing houses (against which zero capital charges are expected to
apply under the proposal). Because most nonfinancial intermediary market
participants are not likely to become general clearing members in clearing
houses, we believe that banks will still offer trades and collect fees from such
participants, but more hedges are likely to be transferred to exchanges and
clearing houses. Although we expect that this could reduce counterparty risk
overall, it might also introduce systemic risks posed by the clearing houses
themselves.... Because clearing houses typically impose initial and variation
margins to general clearing members, we expect that banks likely will seek to
re-price increasing costs to end users, possibly increasing the overall cost of
hedging interest-rate and currency risks for these participants.
Id.
412.
Id.
Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection (Dodd-Frank)
413.
Act § 410(2)(A), Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376, 1762 (2010) (to be codified as
amended in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.).
414.
Id. § 723, 124 Stat. at 1675.
Id. § 731, 124 Stat. at 1704-05 (amending the Commodity Exchange Act, 7
415.
U.S.C. § 1 et seq. (2006), by inserting 7 U.S.C. § 6s(e)).
416.
Id.
417.
Id. § 736.
MARK JICKLING & KATHLEEN ANN RUANE, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R41398,
418.
THE DODD-FRANK WALL STREET REFORM AND CONSUMER PROTECTION ACT: TITLE VII,
http://www.1lsdc.org/attachments/files/239/CRS-R41398.pdf
(2010),
DERIVATIVES
("Swap dealers and major swap participants-firms with substantial derivative
positions-will be subject to margin and capital requirements above and beyond what
the clearinghouses mandate.").
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such infringement could lead to inconsistencies and inefficiencies. 4 19
Moreover, it is unclear how the legislation will be applied to
international transactions. 4 20 An increase in capital is also likely to
result in dividend restrictions, bonus restrictions, and constraints on
equity investments. 4 21 Bonus restrictions and, to a limited extent,
dividend restrictions could make it harder for banks to retain top
talent.4 22 The new rules will, however, be in a test phase until the
end of 2017.423

V.

AN ALTERNATIVE APPROACH TO HEDGE FUND REGULATION

Hedge fund regulators face an interesting dichotomy. On the one
hand, their mandate is to protect investors and ensure wellfunctioning markets. On the other hand, they do not want to overregulate the hedge fund industry, and they need to tailor regulation
to entities that actually engage in activities that give rise to systemic
concerns. The imposition of additional limitations on hedge funds
may impose unwarranted burdens on other types of private
investment pools, such as venture capital funds and structured
financings that do not raise the same issues as hedge funds.
Regulators can use regulatory authority over entities that
interact with hedge funds to regulate hedge funds indirectly.
Alternatively, regulators can use a number of regulatory tools,
including registration, capital, leverage, margin, and reporting
requirements, to regulate hedge funds directly. The complex trading,
investing, and corporate structures of active international hedge
funds are major constraining factors on effective supervision.
Because of the complex structure of both hedge funds and financial
intermediaries, most regulatory authorities base their judgment of
hedge fund-generated market risks on somewhat inadequate
information. 424 However, hedge fund trading strategies are mostly

419.
Letter from David Geen, Gen. Counsel, Int'l Swaps and Derivatives Ass'n,
Inc., to Theo Lubke, OTC Derivatives Supervisors Grp. (Sept. 17, 2010),
http://www.sec.gov/comments/df-title-viilswap/swap- 16.pdf.
CADWALADER, WICKERSHAM & TAFT LLP, THE NEW SCHEMES FOR THE
420.
REGULATION OF SWAPS (2010), http://www.cadwalader.com/assets/clientfriend/072010DF7.pdf.
421.
LINKLATERS, PRO-CYCLICALITY: COUNTERPARTY CREDIT RISK AND LEVERAGE
RATIO 2 (2010), http://www.linklaters.com/pdfs/publications/FRDevs/All7038391A.pdf.
422.
Id.
BIS, BASEL COMM. ON BANKING SUPERVISION, BASEL III: A GLOBAL
423.
REGULATORY FRAMEWORK FOR MORE RESILIENT BANKS AND BANKING INSTITUTIONS 28
(2010), http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs189.pdf.
Registration Under the Advisers Act of Certain Hedge Fund Advisers, 69
424.
Fed. Reg. 72,054, 72,059 (codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 275 & 279 (2008)) (recognizing that
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based on the interpretation of certain market environments and
require a certain level of confidentiality. For instance, engaging in a
securities-based swap agreement to bet against the value of a publicly
listed stock works substantially better if the buyer does not disclose
his or her strategy to other market participants who may otherwise
emulate it and lower the potential profit margin. Hedge funds'
profitability may be directly correlated with their level of
confidentiality. If other market participants trade along or are
enabled to anticipate certain transactions by a hedge fund because of
required disclosures, the disclosing hedge fund may not be able to
fulfill its mandate to maximize shareholders' value, because its
absolute returns may be negatively affected.
Before the financial crisis of 2008-2009, most jurisdictions did
not claim direct regulatory authority over hedge funds. A significant
number of hedge funds operate through offshore centers and are thus
outside the jurisdiction of many legislators.
The problem of
regulatory arbitrage (upon the imposition of direct regulatory
measures by a particular jurisdiction, hedge funds have an exit
option, i.e., relocating to offshore jurisdictions) could have played a
role in deterring regulators from imposing stricter standards before
the financial crisis. Legislators also had disincentives to impose
harsher requirements on the hedge fund industry, because harsher
regulation could have resulted in a loss of franchise taxes and other
business to offshore centers. Before the enactment of the DoddFrank Act, 425 the SEC repeatedly attempted but failed to regulate the
hedge fund industry.426 Under the new regime, certain investment
advisers who manage private funds with less than $150 million AUM
are exempt from federal registration in the United States. 427
Advisers with less than $150 million AUM who had previously not
registered under state law because they complied with federal law
and were registered with the SEC may now be required to deregister
with the SEC and become subject to a state registration
requirement. 4 28
Banks play a prominent role in financial markets and facilitate
hedge fund investments as market makers, creators of complex
financial products, or lenders, among others. As such, they "are well
suited to reduce adverse selection and moral hazard problems in

the regulators lack basic information about hedge funds, often relying on third-party
data that may be unreliable).
425.
Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection (Dodd-Frank)
Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010) (to be codified as amended in scattered
sections of 15 U.S.C.).
426.
See KAAL, supra note 155, at 178-80.
427.
Dodd-Frank Act § 408, 124 Stat. at 1575.
428.
Rules Implementing Amendments to the Investment Advisers Act of 1940,
75 Fed. Reg. 77,054 (Dec. 10, 2010) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 275).
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financial markets,"429 and "banks have particular advantages over
other financial intermediaries in solving asymmetric information
More specifically, banks' lending practices and
problems." 430
counterparty credit risk management (CCRM) may allow them to
curtail excessive risk taking, because they are in a position to use the
threat of cutting off future lending to improve a hedge fund's
behavior. 431 Banks also have advantages in reducing moral hazard,
because they can monitor counterparty credit risk at lower costs than
Contracting with hedge funds in their lending
individuals. 432
practice allows banks to negotiate collateral requirements, specifying
interest rates and other contractual terms. 433 As a result, this helps
to sort borrowers into risk pools that may reduce adverse selection
and moral hazard incentives for borrowers to engage in excessively
risky activities. 434 Establishing risk pools also helps to minimize
information asymmetries in their lending practice. 435 Furthermore,
banks, as market makers, creators of hedge fund products, and
lenders, are in a position to establish long-term relationships that
allow for targeted information collection. This can help to further
minimize information asymmetries, facilitate efficient long-term
4 36
monitoring, and manage hedge fund counterparty credit risk.
Banks' unique position as hedge fund and financial market
intermediaries qualifies them as the primary institution to address
asymmetric information, moral hazard problems, and other primary

429.

Frederic S. Mishkin, PrudentialSupervision: Why Is It Important and What

Are the Issues?, in PRUDENTIAL SUPERVISION: WHAT WORKS AND WHAT DOES NOT 4 n. 1

(Frederic S. Mishkin ed., 2001). ("The traditional financial intermediation role of
banking has been in decline in both the United States and other industrialized
countries because of improved information technology that makes issuing securities
easier. Nonetheless, banks continue to be important in the financial system.").
430.
Id. at 4.
431.
See Joseph E. Stiglitz & Andrew Weiss, Incentive Effects of Terminations:
Applications to Credit and Labor Markets, 73 AM. ECON. REV. 912, 912 (1983) ("[T]he
threat of termination encourages behavior that the [bank]. . . finds desirable").
See Douglas W. Diamond, Financial Intermediation and Delegated
432.
Monitoring, 51 REV. OF ECON. STUD. 393, 393 (1984) (noting that it is cost-effective for
a bank to monitor loan contracts because "the alternative is either duplication of effort
if each lender monitors directly, or a free-rider problem, in which case no lender
monitors").
See Kaal, supra note 6, at 620-21.
433.
434.

JOHN KAMBHU ET AL., HEDGE FUNDS, FINANCIAL INTERMEDIATION, AND

SYSTEMIC RISK 1-2 (2007) (noting that banks are in a unique position to limit their
counterparty credit exposure).
Id. at 10 (suggesting that the connection between hedge funds and the
435.
economy involves the banks' role in resolving information problems).
See Allen N. Berger & Gregory F. Udell, Did Risk-Based Capital
436.
Requirements Allocate Bank Credit and Cause a "Credit Crunch" in the United States?,
26 J. MONEY, CREDIT & BANKING 585, 588 (1994); Leonard I. Nakamura, Commercial
Bank Information: Implications for the Structure of Banking, in STRUCTURAL CHANGE
FOR BANKING 131-60 (M. Klausner & L.J. White eds., 1993).
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concerns in the context of hedge funds activities. This Article does
not attempt to determine how to calculate a potential Basel III charge
on banks' capital assets for their systemic risk exposure to hedge
funds.

1. Moral Hazard and Its Impact on Indirect Regulation of Hedge
Funds via Counterparty Credit Risk Management (CCRM)
The global financial crisis has precipitated a deeply rooted
presumption that taxpayer funds can be used by governments to bail
out banks.
This creates a moral hazard by providing strong
incentives for banks to take excessive risks. Hedge funds are not
counterparties in government bailouts, but if banks get bailed out,
they may have less incentive to monitor their hedge fund lending
activities or other hedge fund-related business.
Given the
opaqueness of the activities of hedge funds, the absence of a common
measure with which to calculate leverage and exposure, and the
dynamic nature of hedge funds' trading strategies, the CCRM process
is also faced with significant information asymmetries. 4 37
Information asymmetries, in turn, obstruct the efficient supervision
of agents by their principals.

2. Systemic Risk and Externalities
To the extent that hedge funds disrupt banks from providing
financial markets with credit, they could create systemic risk. 438 If,
and to what extent, this could have happened in the period leading up
to the financial crisis of 2008-2009 is unclear, but the inability of a
hedge fund to repay bank loans impairs banks' ability to provide
credit to other market participants or liquidity to the financial
system.43 9 After the collapse of LTCM, however, many dealer-banks
required full collateralization of hedge fund transactions. 4 40 This
may have lowered the leverage ratio of hedge funds below that of
most banks. The common exposure to market risk factors of banks'

437.
KAMBHU ET AL., supra note 434, at 1 (averring that hedge funds' use of
leverage and opacity make effective CCRM more challenging).
438.
Id. at 11.
439.
Id. at 19.
Credit exposure to hedge funds may create externalities in the banking system
or broader financial markets in several ways. If the potential exposure amounts
to a significant share of bank capital, for example, then a large shock to hedge
funds could weaken banks and impair their ability to provide liquidity to the
financial system or credit to borrowers.
Id.
440.
Id. at 21, 24 (noting that after the collapse of LTCM, CCRM has improved
and many banks' exposures to hedge funds are collateralized).
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proprietary trading desks and hedge funds could detrimentally
impact their respective trading positions and, thus, the banking
system or broader financial markets on a larger scale. 44 1
An institution or country creates externalities if it manages its
own hedge fund-generated systemic risk without considering the
impact of its actions or inactions on the risk in the system as a
whole. 442 Systemic risk and financial market stability generate
public good and free-rider problems: banks are not incentivized to
adequately monitor or limit hedge fund risk exposure because of their
reliance on hedge fund credit risk management by other banks. 443
Thus, regulation has a role in reducing this inefficient systemic risk.
3. Market Failurein FinancialInstruments
The theory of market failure has been a subject of scholarly
debate for many years. 4 44 Keynesian economist Paul A. Samuelson,
among others, defined the phenomenon of market failure and
formalized it. 445 Other scholars later opined that Samuelson's

441.

Id. at 11.

442.

Id. at 10.

[Miarket failures include agency problems, externalities, free-rider problems,
moral hazard, and coordination failures. We emphasize that these concerns
apply more generally to many types of credit provision, but are likely more
acute where information problems are most severe, where banks are eager to
capture a share of a growing market, and where potential profits are
encouraging stiff competition. Hedge fund exposures fit this description quite
well....
Id.
Id.
443.
444.
For a thorough discussion of the theory of market failure and most of the
arguments pro and contra, see, for example, DOUGLASS C. NORTH & ROBERT P.
THOMAS, THE RISE OF THE WESTERN WORLD: A NEW ECONOMIC HISTORY (1973); PAUL
A. SAMUELSON, ECONOMICS: AN INTRODUCTORY ANALYSIS (6th ed. 1964); DAVID L.
WEIMER & AIDAN R. VINING, POLICY ANALYSIS: CONCEPTS AND PRACTICE, (2d ed. 1992);

Steven N. S. Cheung, The Fable of the Bees: An Economic Investigation, 16 J. L. &
ECON. 11 (1973); Ronald H. Coase, The Lighthouse in Economics, 17 J. L. & ECON. 357
(1974); Louis De Alessi, Error and Bias in Benefit-Cost Analysis: HUD's Case for the
Wind Rule, 16 CATO J. 129 (1996); Joseph Farrell, Information and the Coase Theorem,
1 J. ECON. PERSP. 113 (1987); J.E. Meade, External Economies and Diseconomies in a
Competitive Situation, 62 ECON. J. 54 (1952); Richard Nelson, Roles of Government in a
Mixed Economy, 6 J. POL'Y ANALYSIS AND MGMT. 541 (1987); Charles Wolf, A Theory of

Nonmarket Failure:Framework for Implementation Analysis, 22 J. L. & ECON. 107
(1979).
445.
Samuelson uses an example of a lighthouse to show a
divergence between private advantage and money cost [as seen by a man odd
enough to try to make his fortune running a lighthouse business] and true
social advantage and cost [as measured by lives and cargoes saved in
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arguments were, in many respects, fallacious. 44 6 In some cases,
markets would be inefficient because agreements within the market
were not enforced. 44 7 Market inefficiencies today may not be the
direct result of any inherent failures, but they could be the result of
the neglect to set up an institutional framework.
In 2007, before the credit crisis, the market experienced record
downgrades in mortgage-backed securities.448 Collateralized debt
obligations (CDOs), and other complex debt securities, fueled
unprecedented bank write-downs. "Some AAA rated debt lost all its
value."449 January 2008 was the worst month for CDOs in more than
ten years, with issuance of CDOs grinding to a near halt
worldwide. 450 The value of the CDO market had previously been
estimated at more than $2 trillion. As the value of CDOs fell, the
market for them disappeared. 451 Similar events took place in the
credit default swap (CDS) market. 452 These events in markets for
CDOs and CDSs raised concerns over market failure in financial

comparison to (1) total costs of the lighthouse and (2) extra costs that result
from letting one more ship look at the warning light].
SAMUELSON, supranote 444, at 45 n.1.
See, e.g., THE THEORY OF MARKET FAILURE-A CRITICAL EXAMINATION
446.
(Tyler Cowen ed., 1988) (compiling a collection of primary critiques of market-failure
theory with suggestions on further research).
See, e.g., NORTH & THOMAS, supra note 444, at 8 ("Governments take over
447.
the protection and enforcement of property rights because they can do so at lower cost
than private volunteer groups . . . .").
Timothy A. Canova, FinancialMarket Failure as a Crisis in the Rule of
448.
Law: From Market Fundamentalism to a New Keynesian Regulatory Model, 3 HARV. L.
& POL'Y REV. 369, 382 n.59 (2009) (noting that Moody's alone downgraded over 5,000
securities in 2007).
John Shenn, CDO Market Is Almost Frozen, JPMorgan, Merrill Say,
449.
BLOOMBERG, Feb. 5, 2008, http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=newsarchive&
sid=aN6qn2s5bAuA ("The slowdown of the more than $2 trillion CDO market follows
record downgrades in mortgage-linked securities last year. Some AAA rated debt lost
all its value.").
Paul J. Davies, Trading in CDOs Slows to a Trickle, FIN. TIMES, Feb. 11,
450.
http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/39f3el28-d808-1ldc-98f7-0000779fd2ac.html?nclick2008,
check=1.
IBISWORLD, U.S. INDUSTRY REPORT: PRIVATE EQUITY, HEDGE FUNDS &
451.
INVESTMENT VEHICLES 31 (2008); Jennifer E. Bethel et al., Legal and Economic Issues
in Litigation Arising from the 2007-2008 Credit Crisis 10 (Harvard Law Sch. Program
available at
2008),
08-5,
No.
Paper
Research
Regulation,
on Risk
http://ssrn.comlabstract=1096582 (discussing the significant slowdown in growth of
CDOs when their performance declined in 2007 after housing prices fell and
foreclosures increased).
Adrian Blundell-Wignall et al., The Current Financial Crisis: Causes and
452.
Policy Issues, FIN. MARKET TRENDS 8 (2008), www.oeed.org/dataoecd/47/26/419428
72.pdf (asserting that the early disasters in the crisis involved investment banks that
had massive CDS losses and "[tihe push to keep fee income from securitisation of (lowcapital-charge) mortgages as a key source of earnings growth necessitated moving
further and further into low quality mortgages").
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instruments. 453 Market failure in complex financial instruments
could have been a contributing factor in the recent credit crisis. 454
Hedge funds themselves may not have caused the credit crisis. 455
Nevertheless, legislators in Europe and the United States have used
the impact of hedge funds on market stability to legitimize attempts
to impose stricter rules on hedge funds. 4 56 Professor Romano points
out correctly that: "[Hedge Funds] manage only a small proportion of
the investment universe, particularly as compared to banks' assets
and are far less leveraged than banks." 45 7 However, it appears that
hedge funds do manage a proportionally large part of complex
financial instruments, such as CDOs and other derivatives. 4 58 This
trend seems to be continuing. 459

453.
Adrian Blundell-Wignall et al., The Elephant in the Room: The Need to Deal
with What Banks Do, 2009 OECD J.: FIN. MARKET TRENDS 2 (2009), www.oecd.org/data
oecd/13/8/44357464.pdf.
While some large diversified banks that focused mainly on commercial banking
survived very well, financial conglomerates built on investment banking, the
structuring of complex derivatives and proprietary trading as the main drivers
of growth, as well as other smaller and less diversified banks, particularly
those focused on mortgages, suffered crippling losses.
Id.
Id.; John Patrick Hunt, Credit Rating Agencies and the "Worldwide Credit
454.
Crisis"- The Limits of Reputation, the Insufficiency of Reform, and a Proposal for
Improvement, 2009 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 109, 121 (2009) (describing the credit rating
agencies' failures to assess the risk of CDOs and other complex instruments as a
"common thread" in narratives about what caused the credit crisis).
455.
Romano, supra note 6; see also Stephen Brown et al., Hedge Funds After
Dodd-Frank, N.Y.U. STERN (July 19, 2010, 3:41 PM), http://w4.stern.nyu.edul
("Rather than
blogs/regulatingwallstreet/2010/07/hedge-funds-after-doddfrank.html
causing or contributing to the recent crisis, hedge funds helped mitigate the crisis by
taking some illiquid assets off the balance sheets of other institutions and by providing
liquidity in general.").
See, e.g., 156 CONG. REC. H5233-01 (daily ed. June 30, 2010) (statement of
456.
Rep. Paul Kanjorski) (supporting hedge fund regulation in PFIARA, Rep. Paul
Kanjorski stated: "While hedge funds may not have directly caused this latest financial
crisis, we do know that these investment vehicles have previously contributed to
significant market instability. . . ."); Proposalon Alternative Investment, supra note 60,
at 1.1 ("The risks associated with [AIFM] activities have manifested themselves
throughout the AIFM industry over recent months and may in some cases have
contributed to market turbulence. For example, hedge funds have contributed to asset
price inflation and the rapid growth of structured credit markets.").
Romano, supra note 6, at 4.
457.
458.
BRIT. BANKERS' ASS'N [BBA], CREDIT DERIVATIVES REPORT 2006, at 5
(2006).
459.
Id.
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TABLE 1: MARKET PARTICIPANTS IN CREDIT DERIVATIVES, 2000-2006460

2000

2002

2004

2006

Banks

72

64

60.5

51.5

Hedge Funds

4

8.5

15.5

30

Insurers

15

19.5

13.5

11.5

Pension Funds

2

1.5

3.5

3

Mutual Funds

1.5

2.5

3.5

2.5

3

2.5

1.5

1

1

1

Corporate

Others

1 4.5

1

The British Bankers' Association discontinued publishing this
data in 2007, perhaps in a timely fashion given the unraveling of the
market in credit derivatives. 461 Table 1 shows that since 2000, hedge
funds have steadily increased their share in the credit derivatives
market while banks' role in the market for credit derivatives has
Hedge funds' market share for credit
progressively declined.
derivatives can be expected to continue to rise. Additionally, hedge
funds' (dynamic) trading strategies require the increasing availability
of (credit) derivatives. Taking into account the dominant position of a
select group of banks in the derivatives market and their primary role
as market makers in credit derivatives, 462 perhaps the role of banks
in credit derivatives could be further discounted, making hedge funds
the primary customers and primary users in the market for credit
derivatives.
The role of hedge funds in the credit derivatives market and
the failure of this market could suggest that an increased emphasis

Id. Upon evaluating the raw data, the author provided averages of buyers
460.
protection and sellers protection for each year. The data was discontinued by the
British Bankers' Association (BBA) in 2007.
Currently, there do not seem to be other adequate sources on market
461.
participants in credit derivatives available. When contacted, Jacques Gauthe and the
wholesale team of the BBA reported that the 2006 data is the most recent data on
market participants in credit derivatives produced by the BBA. E-Mail from Jacques
Gauthe, Brit. Bankers' Ass'n, to Caroline Kunz Ivanov, Miss. Coll. Sch. of Law (Jan. 12,
2011) (on file with author). The BBA referred the author to the International Swaps
and Derivatives Association. Id. Dr. David Mengle, Head of Research at the ISDA
indicated that the ISDA did not have specific counterparty information. E-mail from
David L. Mengle, Head of Research, Int'l Swaps & Derivatives Ass'n, to Wulf A. Kaal,
Assoc. Professor & Co-Dir. of Bus. & Tax Law Ctr., Miss. Coll. Sch. of Law (Dec. 6,
2010) (on file with author).
Louise Story, A Secretive Banking Elite Rules Derivatives Trading, N.Y.
462.
TIMES, Dec. 11, 2010, at Al.
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on hedge fund lending exposure is justified. The proposal in this
Article to focus on a charge in Basel III that would apply to the
particular bank's lending exposure to hedge funds could be combined
with Basel III's emphasis on banks' exposure to certain financial
products, 463 such as CDOs, CDSs, and other derivatives that are
frequently used by hedge funds. This would address the crucial link
between market failure in financial instruments and the increasing
role of hedge funds in the market for financial instruments.
Complex financial products had an important role in the recent
credit crisis. 4 6 4 Banks could be expounding, if not doubling, their
exposure to high-risk financial derivatives by having lending
exposure to hedge funds and, at the same time, exposure to financial
derivatives that are most frequently used by hedge funds. A
combination of measures in Basel III for banks' exposure to financial
products and hedge funds could be tailored to account for this added
exposure.
4. Hedge Fund Regulation via Basel III
Banks are ideally positioned to deal with asymmetric
information, moral hazard, and systemic issues pertaining to hedge
The suggested increase in capital requirements for
funds.
Basel III will require default risk capital for counterparty credit risk as
463.
well as increased capital charges on OTC derivatives. BIS, supra note 37, at 31.
[A] bank must add a capital charge to cover the risk of mark-to-market losses
on the expected counterparty risk (such losses being known as credit value
adjustments, CVA) to OTC derivatives. The CVA capital charge will be
calculated ... depending on the bank's approved method of calculating capital
charges for counterparty credit risk and specific interest rate risk.
Id.; BIS, BASEL COMM.
CAPITALISATION

OF

BANK

ON BANKING SUPERVISION, CONSULTATIVE DOCUMENT:
EXPOSURES TO CENTRAL COUNTERPARTIES 2 (2010),

http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbsl90.pdf. ("As part of the Basel III reforms, the Committee
has materially changed the CCR regime. These changes significantly increase the
capital charges associated with bank OTC derivatives and SFTs . . . .").
The Basel III proposal attempts to fix the shortcomings of an earlier revision,
known as Basel II, which was initiated by lenders in the late 1990s and lowered
capital requirements by as much as 29 percent for some banks. The new rules
would tighten control of what goes into the banks' calculation of risk, redefine
what counts as capital and impose higher charges against holdings such as
derivatives.
European Banks Poised to Win Reprieve in Basel on Capital Rules, BUSINESSWEEK,
July 12, 2010, http://www.businessweek.com/news/2010-07-12/european-banks-poisedto-win-reprieve-in-basel-on-capital-rules.html.
See Hunt, supra note 454, at 21 ("[T]he ratings agencies did a poor job
464.
assessing the default risk of CDOs and other instruments based on subprime
RMBS ... [and] high ratings on such securities had an inordinate effect on
markets. . . .").
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counterparty risk in Basel 111465 could be a starting point to establish
a charge for banks' assets based on their lending exposure to hedge
funds and the respective systemic risk contribution. This charge
could apply to the particular bank's lending exposure to certain
financial products, such as CDOs, CDSs, and other derivatives, 4 66
that are frequently used by hedge funds.
However, after the 1998 collapse of LTCM, most dealer-banks
required full collateralization of hedge fund transactions. 46 7
Accordingly, hedge funds were less leveraged than banks, 4 68 dealers
have already reduced risks of lending to funds, and, arguably, no
obvious problem exists for Basel III to address. 469 The collapse of
large hedge funds like Amaranth in 2006470 and large redemptions by
investors during and after the crisis did not cause systemic
problems, 471 and hedge funds have fewer assets and less leverage
than banks, creating less likelihood that hedge funds could cause the
next crisis. Without the threat of systemic risk, it is unclear why
bank lending to hedge funds should be treated differently from bank
lending to other market participants. 4 72
International harmonization of banking regulation through the
Basel Accords may have led a majority of large banks to follow the
same financial strategies, which may have contributed to the
financial crisis.4 73 This trend has large implications for the reforms
proposed in this Article. Greater harmonization of international
banking regulation via Basel III is unlikely to lead to better outcomes
The Basel Accords
and may well exacerbate future crises. 4 74
allegedly produce globally similar business and regulatory

465.
BIS, supra note 37, at 18 (stating that "minimum capital requirements
calculated under Pillar 1 are often insufficient").
See sources cited supra note 463.
466.
Too Big to Swallow, supra note 20 (noting that after the failure of LTCM
467.
there was flight to traditional banking).
Professionally Gloomy, supra note 21 ("After the collapse of Long-Term
468.
Capital Management in 1998, banks started scanning the counterparty horizon more
carefully for risks from hedge funds. From now on they will look much more closely at
each other.").
469.
Contra Jones, supra note 353 (reporting that the Basel Committee feels a
Basel III is necessary to create stringent reforms ensuring banks have sufficient capital
so as to prevent another taxpayer bailout).
470.
Buttonwood: Paint It Black, supra note 22 ("[T]raders repeatedly get caught
out by 'unprecedented' market movements. The collapse of two hedge funds, LongTerm Capital Management in 1998 and Amaranth Advisors in 2006, were cases in
point."); The Galleon Affair: All at Sea, supra note 22 (noting that the case against Raj
Rajaratnam, cofounder of Galleon, for insider trading could decrease the credibility of
hedge funds).
Buttonwood: Paint it Black, supra note 22.
471.
472.
Romano, supra note 6, at 3.
473.
See supra discussion Part IV.2.
Contra We Need a Basel III for a New Order: Soros, supra note 391.
474.
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strategies. 475 As a result of harmonization, mistaken policies may
result in global financial distress. 4 76 For instance, in 2008, many
financial institutions sold assets to improve their long-term prospects
and free themselves from toxic papers. 477 Consequently, prices
plunged and the same institutions were forced to sell even more
Similar effects must be anticipated for greater
assets. 478
centralization.
Changing the regulatory approach in response to crisis is a
common U.S. practice, 4 79 with often-disastrous consequences. 480 It is
cheap, visible, and easily explainable to the general public. However,
it has not been successful. For instance, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of
2002 has been heavily criticized. 48 1 Congress's belief in the
effectiveness of the new systemic regulator, to be created under
Dodd-Frank, could be misplaced. 482 Current forecasting models were
483
not capable of anticipating the last crisis, let alone its depth.

Cf. Barr & Miller, supra note 387, at 21 (relating that the Basel process
475.
was designed to achieve harmonization and coordination of international bank
supervision among the major industrialized countries). Contra Kimberly D. Krawiec,
The Return of the Rogue, 51 ARIZ. L. REV. 127, 133 (2009) (suggesting that because
Basel II only began a phased-in implementation in the United States in January 2009,
it is too early to evaluate its effects).
476.
Verdier, supra note 384, at 338 (suggesting that the current global financial
crisis is due in large part to harmonized capital standards implemented through the
Basel Accord). Contra Cannata & Quagliariello, supra note 384, at 15 (arguing that
Basel II did not play a major role in the financial crisis, and if revised, it should include
greater harmonization of enforcement, as opposed to radical changes).
Bethel et al., supra note 451, at 28 ("In the severely stressed market of
477.
2008, however, numerous financial institutions were selling assets, resulting in a
market glut and plummeting prices.").
Id. ("These lower prices set off rounds of write-downs and a further need to
478.
raise cash and delever.").
Roberta Romano, The Sarbanes-Oxley Act and the Making of Quack
479.
Corporate Governance, 114 YALE L.J. 1521, 1528 (2005) (stating that Sarbanes-Oxley
was "emergency legislation, enacted under conditions of limited legislative debate,
during a media frenzy involving several high-profile corporate fraud and insolvency
cases," all during an economic downturn); see also Larry E. Ribstein, International
Implications of Sarbanes-Oxley: Raising the Rent on U.S. Law 3 (Ill. Law & Econ.
Working Paper Series, Paper No. LEO3-005, 2003), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/
sol3/papers.cfm?abstract id=401660 (stating that the securities laws often go through
periods of punctuated evolution in the wake of stock market crashes).
See, e.g., Ribstein, supra note 479, at 3-4 (summarizing the "perverse
480.
effects" of Sarbanes-Oxley on international securities markets).
481.
Id.
482.
See Viral V. Acharya, Failuresof the Dodd-FrankAct, FIN. TIMES, Jul. 15,
2010, http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/ccbb38ea-9010-lldf-91b6-00144feab49a.html#axzzlBtNc8avl
(asserting that the Dodd-Frank Act both fails to discourage individual firms from
"putting the system at risk" and to regulate by function, as opposed to form).
Erik F. Gerding, Code, Crash, and Open Sources: The Outsourcing of
483.
FinancialRegulation to Risk Models and the Global FinancialCrisis, 84 WASH. L. REV.
127, 136 (2009) (observing that the financial crisis made it clear that industry risk
models failed to anticipate or price financial risk).
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Another major argument against indirect regulation is that if two
banks give loans to hedge funds, neither has an overall view of what
the hedge fund does and what the hedge fund's risk exposure might
be. CCRM will not work effectively unless the bank has an exclusive
relationship with the hedge fund that allows it to control the
relationship.
The role of the Basel Committee is to mitigate transnational
externalities by coordinating supervision over multinational firms.48 4
This coordination, not harmonization, should prevent destabilizing
Moreover, it is not
actions by a country's regulators. 485
harmonization through Basel II that made banks hold similar assets:
banks held similar assets because of the profitability of these
assets. 4 86 Harmonization is only a framework and is not synonymous
with conforming rules and regulations. 487 Basel II calls for selfregulation, allowing banks to be substantially involved in their own
oversight, and is characteristically open-ended and enables efficient
exchange between banks.4 88 The Basel Accords were introduced
specifically to reduce systemic risk from bank failures and to limit
externalities that may lead to a lack of information sharing. 489 The
Accords have succeeded in providing "global public goods of
information" 490 and can help to ensure that banks have sufficient
capital so as to prevent another taxpayer bailout. Moreover, even
though the collapse of large hedge funds like Amaranth and large
redemptions by investors during and after the crisis may not have
caused systemic problems, they are likely to have increased market
pressure on positions held by market participants when rival traders
sold investments ahead of time, anticipating investor redemptions. 491
In isolation, this market pressure on positions will not give rise to
systemic concerns. 49 2 However, if the market is generally distressed,

Zaring, supra note 383, at 480 ("The members declared, via a press release,
484.
that the primary purpose of the Committee would be to provide its members with a
regular forum for airing cooperative approaches to the supervision of multinational
banks.")
485.
Barr & Miller, supra note 387, at 21.
486.
Anastasia Nesvetailova, The Crisis of Invented Money: Liquidity Illusion
and the Global Credit Meltdown, 11 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES IN LAw 125, 140-42 (2010)
(proposing that the banking industry responded to Basel by "driving risky assets off the
balance sheets," instead of strengthening balance sheets by weighing the riskiness of
their assets as was intended by the Basel Accords, and further asserting that banks
were acting out of an "aggressive search for profits").
See Krawiec, supranote 475, at 173.
487.
Id.
488.
Barr & Miller, supra note 387, at 21.
489.
490.
Id. at 22.
491.
See supra note 23.
See generally Romano, supra note 6, at 3 & n.3 (pointing to the lack of
492.
evidence that hedge funds contribute to systemic risk in general).
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a potential exists that this market pressure could contribute to the
general distress.
Even if international harmonization of banking regulation
through the Basel Accords led banks to follow the same financial
strategies and risk models, potentially creating systemic risk, the
federal regulations that incorporated the Basel market risk
amendments have also led many institutions to "significantly improve
their risk modeling techniques, and, in particular their modeling of
specific risk."493 The implementation of Basel II alone is also unlikely
to have caused U.S. and EU banks to be highly leveraged; U.S. banks
are so highly leveraged because of the potential for great reward
when resources are leveraged and risks are taken.494 Some hedge
fund managers do call for a new order through Basel III.495 The
Basel II Accord gives banks a significant amount of flexibility in
selecting the measurement of operational risk and the resulting
capital requirement, 4 96 and it may not have played a major role in the
financial crisis. 497 If revised, it should include greater harmonization
of enforcement, as opposed to radical change. 498
Most hedge funds do have more than one banking
relationship.4 9 9 There may be a risk that CCRM would not work
effectively if the bank does not have an exclusive relationship with
the hedge fund that allows it to control the relationship.5 00 The
exclusivity of a banking relationship is perhaps not the only effective
way to exercise control and manage risk. The intensity, endurance,
and quality of the relationship also influence the level of control a
bank may exercise over a hedge fund.5 0 1 If a bank exercises control

493.
Andre Scheerer, Credit Derivatives: An Overview of Regulatory Initiatives
in the U.S. and Europe, 5 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 149, 179 n.112 (2000).
Cannata & Quagliariello, supra note 384, at 1-2.
494.
We Need a Basel III for a New Order: Soros, supra note 391.
495.
Krawiec, supra note 475, at 129.
496.
Cannata & Quagliariello, supra note 384, at 15.
497.
498.
Id. at 12.
Henry Smith, Prime Brokerage: Changing Relationships, FT MANDATE,
499.
Nov. 1, 2008, at 1.
Amid heightened concern about counterparty risk, the search for a secure
haven for their assets has become hedge funds' top priority. Consequently,
there has been both a -move away from those investment banks regarded as
risky and a drive to diversify exposure by setting up accounts with a number of
different prime brokers. Hedge funds, with the exception of the smallest ones,
are moving to using multiple prime brokers.
Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
500.
See Eddy Wymeersch, The Regulation of Private Equity, Hedge Funds and
State Funds 10 (Fin. Law Inst., Working Paper No. 2010-06, 2010) (emphasizing the
importance of indirect regulation of hedge funds by their banks or "prime brokers").
See Casper G. de Vries & Philip A. Stork, Hedge Funds and Financial
501.
Stability 33 (Pol'y Dep't Econ. & Sci. Pol'y, Study/Briefing Note IP/A/ECON/IC/2007-
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over a hedge fund to the detriment of its performance, the hedge fund
may decide to terminate the banking relationship. 502 On the other
hand, in today's environment of increased scrutiny of lending and
lending relationships, hedge funds could have disincentives to
terminate a lending relationship.50 3 Some of hedge funds' dynamic
trading strategies may depend on the immediate availability of
capital. 504 Without sufficient lines of credit to supply required
additional capital, these trading strategies may not work. Perhaps
banks will have enough influence over hedge funds even if hedge
funds have multiple lending relationships.
Professor Romano raises the question of whether the proposal of
this Article could create incentive problems similar to those of credit
rating agencies. 50 5 Perhaps it is worth pointing out that banks' role
in monitoring hedge funds is not easily comparable to the principalagent problem between buyers of securities and credit rating
agencies. Banks have perhaps more influence over hedge funds than
buyers of securities over credit rating agencies and their ratings.
Basel III capital charges based on a bank's lending exposure to
hedge funds could help to address the threat of regulatory arbitrage.
Implementing a charge for the particular bank's lending exposure to
hedge funds or systemic risk contribution deriving from hedge fund
lending exposure under Basel III would not require any
implementation. Once the bank has signed on to join the framework,
it would merely be the responsibility of the participating banks to
comply with the framework. Hence, transaction costs for national
regulators would be avoided. Regulating hedge funds through rules
in Basel III would also avoid the cost of compliance, as well as
registration and reporting, otherwise required by the AIFM
The AIFM Directive
Directive 506 and the Dodd-Frank Act.50 7

23, 2007), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1120595 ("Hedge funds need banks for
their credit to be able to leverage their positions. Banks profit from hedge funds as
prime brokers and from financing the hedge funds. The banking sector and hedge fund
industry are also strongly intertwined during times of stress.").
502.
KAMBHU ET AL., supra note 434, at 22 (noting that competition for new
hedge fund business could erode CCRM by weakening credit risk management
practices).
503.
Michael R. King & Philipp Maier, Hedge Funds and Financial Stability:
Regulating Prime Brokers Will Mitigate Systemic Risk, 5 J. FIN. STABILITY 283, 295
(2009) ("[Gliven the increasing volume of complex transactions, policymakers are
concerned whether counterparty exposures are being monitored appropriately.").
KAMBHU ET AL., supra note 434, at 3 ("An important part of [the
504.
counterparty and hedge fund] relationships is the extension of credit to the hedge
fund.").
Romano, supra note 6, at 11-12 ("Credit agencies were specially recognized
505.
by government regulation with a role of monitoring the creditworthiness of the
investments that they rated, a policing role similar to what [the author] propose[s] for
banks with respect to hedge funds.").
506.
November 11 Directive, supra note 4, ch. IV, art. 19-21 (providing for
annual reports, reporting obligations, and disclosures to investors).
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introduces the possibility of harmonized requirements for entities
engaged in the management and administration of alternative
investment funds, resulting in Europe-wide regulation of hedge
funds.50 8
Regulation through Basel III would also address issues of
systemic risk because Basel III will not only regulate and alter credit
standards of banks, but also counterparty credit risk and, thus, hedge
funds' level of leverage.50 9 Moral hazard would be addressed because
disclosure of additional information could be necessary to introduce a
charge for the particular bank's lending exposure to hedge funds or to
measure the systemic risk contribution deriving from hedge fund
lending exposure. That disclosure of additional information might
further reduce the capital-leverage ratio of hedge funds. The moral
hazard problems after the bailout of LTCM and the bank bailout in
the aftermath of the financial crisis of 2008-2009 (banks had
disincentives to monitor their counterparty credit risk exposure with
hedge funds if they could rely on taxpayer-funded bailouts)51 0 would
be less likely to occur.
Many of the issues pertaining to hedge fund rules under DoddFrank would perhaps be addressed if the Basel Committee were to
decide to account for banks' lending exposure to hedge funds. The de
minimis investment rule under Dodd-Frank already curtails banks'
exposure to hedge funds.5 1 1 In Basel III, the Basel Committee could
set up rules that account for any remaining exposure. Exclusive
reliance on rules in Basel III alone, however, could be misplaced.
Even the combination of hedge fund regulation via rules in Basel III
and de minimis investment rules in Dodd-Frank could leave open
some issues. The calibration of such a regulatory combination
requires time and experience.

507.
Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection (Dodd-Frank)
Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010) (to be codified as amended in scattered
sections of 15 U.S.C.).
508.
November 11 Directive, supra note 4, ch. I, art. 1. The Directive provides
"rules for the authorisation, ongoing operation and transparency of the managers of
alternative investment funds (AIFM), which manage and/or market such funds in the
union." Id.
509.
See supra note 357.
510.
See discussion supra Part V.4.
511.
See discussion supra Part III.2.b.3, c.5 (discussing the de minimis
Investment Rule under Dodd-Frank).
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VII. CONCLUSION

Recent attempts at regulating hedge funds by registering them
with regulators and requiring disclosure of pertinent information
could help to minimize moral hazard, social externalities, and
systemic risk generated by the hedge fund industry. The extent of
hedge funds' involvement in the credit crisis of 2008-2009 remains
unclear. Asymmetric hedge fund regulation in Dodd-Frank and the
AIFM Directive is counterproductive. The AIFM Directive could
create incentives for regulatory arbitrage and could potentially cause
retaliatory action by non-EU countries. In the long run, it could
undermine the competitiveness of the European Union's alternative
investment community and financial markets in Europe. In DoddFrank, Congress authorized the SEC to implement rules to interpret
the exemptions for hedge funds. The SEC should use its discretion to
provide much-needed guidance. Many of the regulatory complications
in the AIFM Directive and the Dodd-Frank Act could be avoided
if the Basel Committee were to introduce a charge for banks' lending
exposure to hedge funds. Basel III capital requirements for banks
could introduce a charge for a bank's assets based on its systemic risk
contribution. The Basel III measure for hedge fund lending exposure
could be combined with an emphasis on banks' exposure to complex
financial products. This could help to address the link between
market failure in financial instruments and the increasing role of
hedge funds in the market for financial instruments.

